


EDUCATION FOR PHILIPPINE PACIFICATION: HOW THE U.S. USED EDUCATION
AS PART OF ITS COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY
IN THE PHILIPPINES FROM 1898 TO 1909



A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

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Art of War

by
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

EDUCATION FOR PHILIPPINE PACIFICATION: HOW THE U.S. USED EDUCATION AS PART OF ITS COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY IN THE PHILIPPINES FROM 1898 TO 1907, by Major Louis J. Ruscetta, 107 pages.

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ACRONYMS

AG	Adjutant General
AAG	Assistant Adjutant General
B	Box Number
CARL	Special Collections and Archives Section, Combined Arms Research Library, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS
E	Entry Number
F	File number
HQ	Headquarters
M	Microfilm
MDLC	Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress
MHI	Military History Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA
NAB	National Archives Building, Washington, DC
NACP	National Archives at College Park, MD
R	Microfilm Roll
RG	Records Group
SecWar	Secretary of War
WHT	William Howard Taft Papers, MDLC

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The most effective means of subjugating a people is to capture their minds. Military victory does not necessarily signify conquest. As long as feelings of resistance remain in the hearts of the vanquished, no conqueror is secure.¹

— Renato Constantino

The U.S. Army's current Counterinsurgency Field Manual highlights the important role of the population in counterinsurgency operations, so much so, that it defines victory in terms of the population and not the armed resistance of the insurgency: “Victory is achieved when the populace consents to the government’s legitimacy and stops actively and passively supporting the insurgency.”² Military personnel who use this field manual and its definition for success should proceed with caution and may do well by also looking at the histories of past counterinsurgency operations. How does a military force or a government stop the population from supporting insurgents? It is a complex problem and there is usually no simple solution. However, militaries have been quick to attach catch phrases such as “winning hearts and minds” and “population-centric counterinsurgency” without knowing what it entails.

It seems that in the U.S.’s latest counterinsurgency operations, military officers have arrived in theater with a rifle slung over their shoulder and a copy of David Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* in the other, trying to follow his steps

¹Renato Constantino, “The Mis-Education of the Filipino,” *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 30, no. 3 (2000): 429.

²U.S. Army, United States Army Field Manual (FM)3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-3.

of operations like a checklist.³ While an interesting read which offers good insight into the guidelines of planning and executing counterinsurgency operations, it should not be used as dogma. Military commanders and strategic planners are better off supplementing Galula's theory with historical content. The Philippine-American War is one example of a successful counterinsurgency that demonstrated the many tactical, operational, and strategic issues inherent in counterinsurgency efforts that officer should understand.

Of particular interest is how the U.S. gained the support of the Philippine population. In addition to their normal duties, military members acted as civil agents in the occupied areas. Ranking officers filled the roles of provincial and island governors and established local governments. Others acted as city workers and spent considerable effort building up the country's infrastructure such as roads, railroad tracks, and schools in order to support the population. And yet, others were teachers, agents of American benevolence and enlightenment. As Galula states, "To confine soldiers to purely military functions while urgent and vital tasks have to be done . . . would be senseless. The soldier must then be prepared to become a propagandist, a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout."⁴

The Philippines were in turmoil before the Americans arrived. In 1896, Filipinos led by Emilio Aguinaldo, revolted against the Spanish and a year-long revolutionary war ensued. After the war ended, Spanish and friar control over the population remained as well as revolutionary hopes for independence. Shortly afterwards, the Spaniards were at

³For Galula's steps in conducting counterinsurgency operations, see Chapter 7 of David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 75-94.

⁴Ibid., 62.

war again, this time against the United States. The first ground war between the Spanish and the American forces in the Philippines occurred on 13 August 1898 with the American capture of Manila. In December, the U.S. annexed the archipelago from Spain for twenty million dollars, and the Philippine revolutionaries' hopes for independence diminished. Tensions rose between the American forces and Aguinaldo's Army of Liberation. Then, on 21 December, McKinley proclaimed to his commanders that he wanted them to win the "confidence, respect, and affection" of the Filipinos and to demonstrate to the native population that America's mission was "one of benevolent assimilation."⁵

The Army began to engage itself in Philippine civil affairs prior to McKinley's proclamation as a way to win the population's support for U.S. presence in the country, and had already opened a number of schools. The army looked to its civil affairs actions, especially those of education, as pacification tools to gain the population's support in order to help suppress anti-American sentiment and violence among the population. Filipinos reacted favorably to the Army's educational efforts. As such, soldier involvement in the Philippine educational system continued after war broke out on 4 February 1899 against the Army of Liberation. Aguinaldo realized he could not defeat the Americans conventionally, and in November, the conflict evolved into a guerrilla style war. The U.S. found itself in its first counterinsurgency operation on foreign soil. During the conflict, U.S. soldiers continued to build schools within the occupied towns and detailed soldiers as teachers. After the war's official end on 4 July 1902, the American

⁵James H. Blount, *The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913), 149.

civil government assumed executive control of most of the islands and continued the U.S.'s emphasis on educating Filipinos.

The civil government's reasons for pacification differed slightly from that of the military; American politicians in the islands desired to win the support of the population so it would accept American governance within the archipelago. To do so, the government built a narrative around Filipino self-governance and created an educational system to meet their goals.

The complexities of the Philippine-American War make it a fascinating area of study. Most of the scholarship in this area has focused on the military defeat of the insurgency. Only within the past twenty years have studies shown that the war in the Philippines was less of a national insurgent uprising and more of a decentralized insurgency across multiple regions.⁶ However, relatively little has been accomplished which examines the combination of the military and civilian government's efforts and how they were integrated. Even more rare is the study of how the U.S. used education to help pacify the islanders. The author has found no studies which focus on the military's emphasis on education during the time period most historians claim encompasses the Philippine-American War, 1899 to 1902. Additionally, the only research conducted on the U.S.'s use of education after the official end of the war is in the context of nation-building and societal change, but not of the government's continued pacification efforts.⁷

⁶Brian M. Linn, "Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1901: The First District Department of Northern Luzon," *Military Affairs* 51, no. 2 (1987): 62.

⁷Historian Glenn May studied the successes and failures of the U.S.'s efforts to build an educational in the Philippines as a tool for nation-building and societal change. For more information, see Glenn Anthony May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*:

Using mostly primary sources, this study will look at how the U.S. deliberately used education as part of its counterinsurgency strategy in the Philippines to pacify anti-occupation violence and assimilate the archipelago under American governance. It will also highlight America's educational efforts to assimilate and "civilize" African Americans, during the post Civil War Reconstruction period, and American Indians, during the U.S.'s expansion to the Western Territories and how the U.S. transferred those lessons to its actions in the Philippines. This study focuses on the Christianized tribes of the archipelago and will cover the period of American involvement in the Philippines between 1898 and 1909.⁸

This study contains three main sections. Chapter 2 examines the U.S.'s efforts to educate and assimilate African Americans and the American Indians during America's Reconstruction period and America's Westward expansion and how U.S. officials used those lessons in the Philippines. Chapter 3 will highlight the U.S. Army's use of education in its pacification efforts from 1898 until responsibility for education transferred to the civilian government in September 1900. Chapter 4 will explain the civilian government's use of education as a means to pacify the population to accept American governance from September 1900 until 1909. Most of the information for this study has come from primary source material. There is little available which highlights

The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980).

⁸The Christianized Filipinos made up over 90 percent of the population. The Americans treated non-Christian tribes, or Moros, differently. Educational efforts were more decentralized and controlled by the military and civilian governors of their specific areas, and not by the Commission. As such, study of educational pacification efforts warrants separate study.

the Filipino point of view. What does exist is mostly from the upper-class, which for the most part, was the only literate demographic. As such, most reports of Filipino reaction to the American's efforts come from a military and civil government perspective. However, some are from Filipino leaders.

CHAPTER 2

EDUCATION LESSONS FROM RECONSTRUCTION AND THE AMERICAN-INDIAN WARS

We are going to conquer the Indians by a standing army of school-teachers, armed with ideas, winning victories by industrial training, and by the gospel of love and the gospel of work.⁹

— Merrill Gates, Rutgers University President,
Speech at the Lake Mohonk Conference, 1891

American goals in the Philippines reflected the mixture of liberal and conservative views representative of the Progressive era in the U.S. at the turn of the twentieth century.¹⁰ Military and civilian policy makers such as Major General Elwell Otis and Governor William H. Taft saw it as the government's responsibility to elevate Philippine society so natives could attain the same success and status Americans had previously achieved. Alongside the liberal ideas of government intervention for the "highest advancement, happiness, and prosperity" of the Filipinos, Philippine policies also enforced conservative ideals such as Christian values, individual wealth, and self-governance.¹¹ Lawmakers mandated that Filipino voters must possess the ability to read and write in Spanish or English, or hold enough land to warrant a yearly payment of at

⁹ As quoted in David Wallace Adams, *Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience, 1875-1928* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 27.

¹⁰ Anthony James Jones, "Counterinsurgency in the Philippines 1898-1954," in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 46.

¹¹ William H. Taft, "Inaugural Address" 4 July 1901, *William Howard Taft Papers* [hereafter WHT], MDLC, M R 563. This specific quotation was taken from President McKinley's letter to Governor Taft congratulating him on his new responsibilities. Taft quoted from the letter in his inaugural address as Governor.

least 30 pesos.¹² These laws incentivized lower class Filipinos to gain an education and accumulate wealth, benefits normally restricted to their society's elite.

In addition to America's progressive views, Americans saw the development of the U.S. education system as a major factor in the modern societal successes of the country and, as historian Emily Rosenberg noted in her book *Spreading the American Dream*, a universal model for the advancement of other cultures.¹³ The U.S. tested this model during the post-Civil War Reconstruction era and again during its expansion to the Pacific Ocean. During these periods, the country learned of the need to augment the use of force with education to achieve social stability among a population.¹⁴

Education was one of the many answers to the question of how to integrate the cultures of freedmen and Indians with a white-American culture based on Anglo-Saxon values. Some of those charged with answering the question, like Otis and Dr. David Prescott Barrows, would find themselves in a similar situation in the Philippines. Armed with experience, the leadership within the Philippine government looked to African American and American Indian education in the U.S. as a guide for its efforts to pacify Filipinos to accept U.S. presence. During Reconstruction, the U.S. established school systems in the southern states to advance education for blacks. The army experimented with education during the American-Indian Wars as a way to "civilize" the American

¹²Glenn Anthony May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, 45. The law also extended voting rights to former municipal government members who held office during Spanish rule.

¹³Rosenberg labeled this belief as Liberal Developmentalism. For more information, see Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 7-8.

¹⁴Ibid., 39-41.

Indians and established a school curriculum and environment designed to change their savage culture. Both systems attempted to provide instruction to allow for the full benefits of citizenship and assimilate different races and culture into a white society.

Education for Reconstruction

The Civil War Reconstruction era led Americans to view education as a pillar for pacification efforts. Even Major General William T. Sherman, well known for his violent and brutal “March to the Sea” during the Civil War, recognized the necessity to rely on more than military action to pacify a population when he said, “no matter what change we may desire in the feelings and thoughts of the people [in the] South, we cannot accomplish it by force.”¹⁵ While his comments applied to Southerners, it revealed the enlightened thinking that was developing within the Army as certain pockets within American society. With similar notions, General Nathaniel Banks, from Massachusetts, established schools for blacks during the Union’s occupation of Louisiana before the war’s end. The Army recognized that education was an effective means for long-term influence over a population.¹⁶

For blacks in general, the desire for education was only superseded by the desire for freedom. In fact, the two were closely linked together. As one former slave

¹⁵As quoted in Andrew. J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2004), 57.

¹⁶David Tyack and Robert Lowe, “The Constitutional Moment: Reconstruction and Black Education in the South,” *American Journal of Education* 94, no. 2 (1986): 241-42.

exclaimed, it “was the next best thing to liberty.”¹⁷ For example, education offered blacks the ability to read from the Bible and not have to rely on their masters to read only selected parts. Since many states outlawed the schooling of blacks before the Civil War, education became a symbol of freedom. As one North Carolina society member stated, “he thought a school-house would be their first proof of their independence.”¹⁸ The desire for education was high among blacks in the South. After the Civil War, some black communities established and supported local schools, even taxing themselves for the necessary funds. Education was not limited to the schoolhouse; quite often children came home and help taught their parents the same elementary subjects they were learning in school.¹⁹

The Army provided blacks one of their earliest opportunities for education. It began educating blacks soldiers in 1863 with resources mostly donated from private Northern organizations.²⁰ Schooling offered blacks another incentive to enlist in the military as well as the opportunity to fight for their freedom. After the war, black Union veterans gained prominent positions in their communities and the country, such as Josiah T. Walls, who represented Florida in the U.S. House of Representatives. As many as 130 black veterans served in political office.²¹

¹⁷As quoted in Eric Foner, *Forever Free: The Story of Emancipation and Reconstruction* (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 86.

¹⁸Ibid., 89.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Tyack and Lowe, “The Constitutional Moment,” 242.

²¹Foner, *Forever Free*, 54.

After the war, the U.S. needed to integrate the southern states back into the Union. In March 1865, Congress established the Freedmen's Bureau to "assist in the birth of a free society in the South."²² In doing so, the Bureau faced a dilemma on what to do with all of the freed slaves in the South; they had no formal education, no land, and no paying jobs. One major issue with black integration into white society was their high illiteracy rate. In 1870, the southern black illiteracy rate reached close to 80 percent.²³ Some business owners preyed on the freedman's inability to read and placed unfair clauses in their labor contracts.²⁴ Under the direction of General Oliver O. Howard, the Bureau viewed education as the foundation to achieve its goal to prepare freedmen for their new way of life as full citizens.

As a form of social control, schools prepared free slaves for the benefits of American citizenship. Schoolhouses taught black children traditional academic subjects as well as white societal norms such as hygiene, religious devotion, and promptness. They were taught how to read and write and became knowledgeable in business and labor transactions. Howard also sought to mimic schools in the North and instruct students to interact with the local economy to allow African Americans to break the social class barrier.²⁵

²²Ibid., 97.

²³Tyack and Lowe, "The Constitutional Moment," 249.

²⁴Ibid., 240.

²⁵Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877*, 1st Perennial Classics ed. (New York: Perennial Classics, 2002), 144-47.

The military was not alone in recognizing education's potential effect on raising the freedmen's societal status. The country's Reconstruction period offered northern legislators a short window of opportunity to enhance educational opportunities for blacks in the South. Legislator groups, such as the Radical Republicans, desired educational reform as a precondition for the re-admittance of the Rebel states back into the Union. They pushed for the former Confederate states to "establish public schools which shall be open to all without distinction of race or color, to the end that where suffrage is universal, education may be universal also, and the new governments find support in the intelligence of the people."²⁶ As justification, Republicans used Article IV of the U.S. Constitution, which mandates the U.S. government guarantee to all the States a Republican form of government.²⁷ Politicians saw education as essential to government participation and citizenship.

Some politicians took action, as did the Radical Republicans within government who desired to elevate blacks as full U.S. citizens and make public education a vital issue for their cause. On the lack of education in South, Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner once stated:

In a republic education is indispensable. A republic without education is like the creature of imagination, a human being without a soul, living and moving blindly, with no sense of the present or the future. It is a monster. Such have been the rebel states. They have been for years nothing more than a political monster.²⁸

²⁶Tyack and Lowe, "The Constitutional Moment," 243.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid., 237.

Northern politicians and philanthropists who fought for black schooling “believed in the power of education to upraise blacks from the degradation of slavery and to make them responsible workers and agents.”²⁹

Assimilating the American Indian

Much like Howard, philanthropists in the U.S. thought social evolution through education rather than military force would result in long-term Indian pacification. As long the U.S. could make the Indian understand America’s altruistic intentions, they would come to accept the Anglo-Saxon values as their own. School advocates within the U.S. viewed education as a short-cut to advancement of Indian civilization because “if Indian children could gain entrance to the common school, they would enter the struggle of life with roughly the same advantages as the children of their more civilized white neighbor.”³⁰ The Army established Indian schools as a means of civilizing Indians to integrate them into American society as near-equals to the white man. During General George R. Crook’s tours as Commander of the Department of Arizona, in 1871 to 1875 and again from 1882 to 1886, he established schools so that “as the Apaches gained in prosperity and knowledge, they would gradually cast off their ‘primitive’ tribalism and assimilate into mainstream American culture.”³¹

²⁹Ibid., 241.

³⁰Adams, *Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience, 1875-1928*, 19.

³¹Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*, 78-85.

Americans still had to determine what role Indians would fill in society. The belief in racial superiority was present in most Americans during Reconstruction and the American Indian Wars. Because of the racial background of African Americans, whites viewed them as second class citizens. However, not everyone shared the Darwinist belief regarding Indians. While many argued that racial background was a cause for the Indians savage nature, others viewed it as a product of their culture. U.S. Army Captain Richard Pratt, who founded the Indian School at Carlisle Barracks, was one such individual. Pratt's beliefs differed from the time's popular slogan, "The only good Indian is a dead one;" instead he held the principle, "Kill the Indian in him and save the man."³² He believed their savagery was not innate, but an aspect of their upbringing and surroundings. Pratt stated in more specificity to this point:

It is a great mistake to think that the Indian is born an inevitable savage. He is born a blank, like the rest of us. Left in the surroundings of savagery, he grows to possess a savage language, superstition, and life. We, left in the surroundings of civilization, grow to possess a civilized language, life, and purpose. Transfer the infant white to the savage surroundings, he will grow to possess a savage language, superstition, and habit. Transfer the savage-born infant to the surroundings of civilization, and he will grow to possess a civilized language and habit.³³

According to Pratt, Indians possessed the capability for full integration into white society.³⁴ In his view, the Indian boarding school was the best avenue to accomplish this goal. While the curriculum of on-reservation schools and boarding schools were

³² Adams, *Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience, 1875-1928*, 52.

³³ As quoted in Adams, *Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience, 1875-1928*, 52.

³⁴ Anne Paulet, "To Change the World: The Use of American Indian Education in the Philippines," *History of Education Quarterly* 47, no. 2 (2007): 185-87.

comparable, Pratt designed boarding schools around a controlled cultural environment. The schools created an environment filled with Anglo-Saxon values which Americans believed to be a necessary requirement to enter white society, an aspect Reservation schools could not accomplish since, after class, students would return to their Indian homes and environments. Pratt postulated that only by taking the Indian away from the influences of the tribe and placing him in a controlled environment could Indians achieve complete and rapid assimilation.³⁵

In addition to Pratt's efforts, philanthropists also desired a solution with respect to the Indian question. In 1883, Albert K. Smiley, a member of the Board of Indian Commissioners, established the Lake Mohonk Conference. The conference met annually for thirty years and became a venue so reformers "could come together for the purpose of translating the emerging consensus into concrete policy recommendations."³⁶ The group established both short and long term goals for Indian assimilation; discussed topics such as education, culture, and citizenship; and passed resolutions for policy reforms. The group linked Indian education with the government's desire to "elevate him out of his physical and moral degradation, and place him on an equal footing with his white brethren."³⁷ The committee documented and published the conference proceedings for

³⁵ Adams, *Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience, 1875-1928*, 48-53.

³⁶Ibid., 11.

³⁷As quoted in Paulet, "To Change the World: The Use of American Indian Education in the Philippines," 187.

distribution to Congress and the media. It became one of the most influential voices with respect to Indian reform.³⁸

Indian educators established four main priorities for Indian education: provide the basic educational elements of reading, writing, and speaking English; provide Indians with a sense of individualization; a sense of Christianization; and instill the meaning and duties of citizenship.³⁹ The Second Annual Lake Mohonk Conference concluded in 1884:

That education is essential to civilization. The Indian must have knowledge of the English language, that he may associate with his white neighbors and transact business as they do. He must have practical industrial training to fit him to compete with others in the struggle for life. He must have a Christian education to enable him to perform duties of the family, the state, and the Church.⁴⁰

The quorum of educators, politicians and philanthropists concluded that if Indian schooling could achieve its four objectives, American Indians would be ready to interact with whites as near-equals.

Modeled after the U.S. public school system, the school curriculum introduced Indian students to the knowledge of Western civilization and citizenship. As the first priority, English instruction became the necessary foundation for the remaining subjects. In 1890, Thomas J. Morgan, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, outlined a curriculum which emphasized math, the sciences, and U.S. history.⁴¹ At first, many of the Indian

³⁸ Adams, *Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience, 1875-1928*, 11.

³⁹ Ibid., 21-24.

⁴⁰ As quoted in Paulet, “To Change the World: The Use of American Indian Education in the Philippines,” 193.

⁴¹ Adams, *Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience, 1875-1928*, 142-45.

students were skeptical of the instruction, especially in science, since the teachings were far different than that of their tribal elders. In his book, *Education for Extinction*, David Adams tells a story of a class' reluctance to a teacher's forecast of a moon eclipse. The teacher told the students the exact day and time of the eclipse. The students laughed in disbelief. However, when the moon did eclipse exactly as predicted, the students never questioned their instructor in that subject.⁴²

One aspect of Indian culture Americans thought education could change was the Indians' loyalty and connection to their tribe. In the government's view, Indians needed to provide the country with some benefit. As their second priority, educators saw the need to separate Indians from their tribal dependencies and instill the American individualistic ideals of work ethic, personal wealth and ownership. To achieve this, schools taught Indian males labor skills such as farming and basic carpentry; girls were taught home skills such as cooking and cleaning.⁴³ Indians would learn the values of ownership and wealth from an idea spawned at the Lake Mohonk Conference. Congress enacted the Dawes Act in 1887, to assist in the individualization of Indians through the distribution of land. The distribution of land to Indians' families killed the sense of communal ownership prevalent within tribes. Alice Fletcher, a prominent member of the Mohonk Conference lauded the bill and stated, "The Indian may now become a free man; free from the thralldom of the tribe; freed from the domination of the reservation system; free

⁴²Ibid., 144.

⁴³Ibid., 149.

to enter into the body of our citizens. This bill may therefore be considered as the Magna Carta of the Indians of our country.”⁴⁴

Christianization was another part of the American’s goal to civilize Indians. Christianity directly tied back to America’s Puritan roots and, in line with the era’s Progressive thinking, was one of the reasons Americans believed they had achieved cultural dominance. Thus it was no surprise that the government’s Indian Office regulated, “Pupils of Government schools shall be encouraged to attend the churches and Sunday-schools of their respective denominations.”⁴⁵ Instruction included multiple Sunday religious services and an evening prayer meeting mid-week. In addition to regularly scheduled religious services, teachers conducted “moral training” whenever possible and students were instructed in the “ideals of charity, chastity, monogamy, respect for the Sabbath . . . an almost endless array of personal characteristics important to the formation of ‘character.’”⁴⁶

Lastly, schools prepared students for full citizenship with teachings on the principle of government, law, politics, and constitutional rights. Many philanthropists, like those gathered at Lake Mohonk, desired Indians receive full American citizenship. Citizenship became a legal hurdle to assimilation, on top of the already discussed racial and cultural impediments. The U.S. relied on treaties to document agreements with

⁴⁴ As quoted in Nebraskastudies.org, “The Dawes Act 1887,” http://www.nebraskastudies.org/0600/frameset_reset.html?http://www.nebraskastudies.org/0600/stories/0601_0200.html (accessed 12 November 2012).

⁴⁵ As quoted in Adams, *Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience, 1875-1928*, 166.

⁴⁶ As quoted in Ibid., 168. Aspects of religious instruction in Indian schools can be found in pages 166-73.

Indian nations, a vehicle normally reserved for international dealings. As such, the U.S. Supreme Court tried to define the relationship between Indian and American in *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* where Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in 1831:

The condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence. . . . They acknowledge themselves in their treaties to be under the protection of the United States. . . . [and] under the sovereignty and domination of the United States. . . . They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will. . . . they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.⁴⁷

Even though reservations were within the country's borders, they were looked upon as a separate nation, with its occupants loyal to the tribe rather than the U.S. Only those Indians who were not born on a reservation or those who were naturalized were considered as American citizens.⁴⁸ Schools prepared Indians for naturalization and taught "students in the principles of republicanism, the rights and obligations of citizenship, and the structure of federal, state, and local governments."⁴⁹ Indians enrolled in the schools were taught American history and were made to celebrate American holidays such as Columbus Day, Washington's Birthday, and the Fourth of July to instill a new identity of Americanism within the natives.⁵⁰ Civics instruction became another medium for

⁴⁷As quoted in Walter L. Williams, "United States Indian Policy and the Debate over Philippine Annexation: Implications for the Origins of American Imperialism," *The Journal of American History* 66, no. 4 (1980): 811.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Adams, *Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience, 1875-1928*, 146.

⁵⁰Ibid., 191-206.

educators to break the Indians' bond with their tribe so they can realize their loyalty to the United States.

Educators also sought to instill other facets of civilization to the Indian. Teachers held classes on personal hygiene and other visible measures of civility such as home upkeep and work ethic.⁵¹ Many schools, especially boarding schools, had model homes on display to showcase how such a home should be kept. The goal was that female students would return to their homes on the reservations, willingly making changes to their homes based on their instruction. At the time, "a home's tasteful interior could reveal the class status, artistic and moral sensibilities, and Anglo-Saxon values of the inhabitants. . . [it could] uplift both family members and visitors by impressing upon them the virtue of civilized life."⁵² While far from perfect, the U.S. used the educational experience gained from Reconstruction and the American-Indian Wars as a guideline to civilize a Filipino nation on the other side of the world.

Exporting Lessons to the Philippines

Americans tended to view Filipinos in the same light they viewed blacks and Indians. Thus in answer to the Philippine question, government officials and policy makers only had to look to their recent history. The dark color of Filipino skin and the feeling of racial superiority led some Americans to view their Filipino counterparts equivalent to blacks. Dean Worcester, a University of Michigan zoologist, took two

⁵¹David B. Tyack, *The One Best System: A History of American Urban Education* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 235-36.

⁵²Jane E. Simonsen, "'Object Lessons': Domesticity and Display in Native American Assimilation," *American Studies* 43, no. 1 (2002): 82.

exploratory trips to the Philippines in 1887 and 1890 before he served on the Philippine Commission from 1899 to 1901 and as the Philippine Insular Government's Secretary of Interior from 1901 to 1913. He authored numerous publications regarding the different Filipino tribes, comparing them to African Americans. In writing about the Mangyan tribe, he described them as "a half-breed race between the Negrito (the little black aborigines in the archipelago) and some Malay tribe."⁵³ In addition to the perceived racial similarities to blacks, Americans viewed Filipinos as savages, and much like Indians, lacked the necessary skills for civilization and self-government.

In May 1900, Taft appointed Fred Atkinson as the Commission's first General Superintendent of Public Instruction in the hopes of preparing Filipinos for self-governance. As Superintendent charged with taking over the school system from the military, Atkinson relied on the U.S.'s black educational system as a guide to advance education in the Philippines. Atkinson concentrated on primary and industrial education, working with black educators like Booker T. Washington to help build a curriculum framework for Filipinos that was geared to his perception of their racial capabilities. In using history as a guide, Atkinson wrote:

In this system we must beware the possibility of overdoing the matter of higher education and unfitting the Filipino for practical work. We should heed the lesson taught us in our reconstruction period when we started to educate the negro. The

⁵³Roland Sintos Coloma, "'Destiny Has Thrown the Negro and the Filipino Under the Tutelage of America': Race and Curriculum in the Age of Empire," *Curriculum Inquiry* 39, no. 4 (2009): 502. Here, Coloma argues that U.S. officials and the press displayed Filipinos as blacks, which led to their depiction of an uncivilized nation and an education system designed around the U.S.'s black schools.

education of the masses here must be an agricultural and industrial one, after the pattern of our Tuskegee Institute at home.⁵⁴

Washington concurred with the idea of teaching industrial education to non-whites.

Believing the Filipinos were capable of education and becoming a race of more than just laborers, Taft dismissed Atkinson in the Fall of 1902.⁵⁵

Taft believed, just as Pratt had with the Indians, that Filipinos were capable of much more than subjugation. He described his perceptions of Filipinos to Secretary of War, Elihu Root, in July 1900 as:

They are generally lacking in moral character; are, with some notable exceptions, prone to yield to any pecuniary consideration; and difficult persons out of whom to make an honest government. We shall have to do the best we can with them. They are born politicians; are as ambitious as Satan, and as jealous as possible of each other's preferment.⁵⁶

After Atkinson's removal, Taft thought Barrows, who received his PhD in Indian studies, was the best replacement and appointed him as General Superintendent of Public Instruction in August 1903.⁵⁷

While head of the Bureau of Wild Tribes, Barrows traveled back to the Untied States in 1902 to investigate how American experiences with the Indians could be utilized in the Philippines. He sent a letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs announcing his intentions and telling him, "I have arrived in this country under directions

⁵⁴As quoted in May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913*, 93.

⁵⁵Ibid., 96.

⁵⁶William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 14 July 1900, WHT, MDLC, M R640.

⁵⁷Paulet, "To Change the World: The Use of American Indian Education in the Philippines," 187-89.

from the U.S. Philippine Commission to make certain investigations both of the scientific and administrative work for American Indians, that may assist us in organizing similar measures in the Philippines.”⁵⁸ However, Barrows’ disdain for Indian boarding schools was apparent in the conclusion of his investigation when he stated, “The whole system is exceedingly expensive and is nearly useless to the Indian.”⁵⁹ Barrows did, however, favor the Indian reservation schools stating, “reservation schools in the United States have done an infinitely better work, and their plan can be more profitably followed here in this archipelago.”⁶⁰

Conclusion

Philanthropists, politicians, and people of influence within the U.S. viewed blacks and Indians as people in need of civilization. At the same time, they also argued the U.S. had reached the tip of the civilization scale through hard work, dedication, and divine intervention. There is little doubt America’s politicians possessed beliefs of moral supremacy. Indiana Senator Albert Beveridge wrote to President Teddy Roosevelt that “[God] has made us adept in government that we may administer government among savages and senile peoples. . . . He has marked the American people as His chosen nation

⁵⁸ As quoted in Ibid., 189.

⁵⁹ As quoted in Ibid., 190. While the boarding schools were able to transform Indians into productive Americans, they had a small success rate in its attempts at graduates returning and bringing civilization into the tribes. For more information see Adams, *Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience, 1875-1928*.

⁶⁰ As quoted in Paulet, “To Change the World: The Use of American Indian Education in the Philippines,” 191.

to finally lead in the regeneration of the world.”⁶¹ Despite the view of American moral superiority, the question still remained of how to influence lesser peoples to follow in America’s footsteps.

Policymaker’s confidence in their ability to transplant American culture to the Philippines stemmed from the Progressive’s view of American society. Their perceived successes in pacification of the freedmen and American Indian strengthened this view. Many of the civilian policy and decision makers in the Philippines, such as Barrows, had experience with pacification.⁶² The military also had significant pacification experience in the Philippines; of the 30 Generals who served in the Philippine-American War, 87 percent had served in the American-Indian Wars. All four men who became military governors in the Philippines: Generals Wesley Merritt, Otis, Arthur MacArthur, and Adna R. Chaffee had experience pacifying Indians.⁶³

The military and civilian leadership retained significant experience from the country’s Reconstruction period and the American-Indian Wars and exported their strategies to the Philippines. The U.S. used education after the Civil War to help assimilate blacks into white society. The Army was one of the first American institutions to openly educate blacks. Later, the government established laws directing states to include universal education in their constitutions. In addition, the Freedmen’s Bureau

⁶¹As quoted in Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945*, 41.

⁶²Paulet, “To Change the World: The Use of American Indian Education in the Philippines,” 187-89.

⁶³Walter L. Williams, “United States Indian Policy and the Debate over Philippine Annexation: Implications for the Origins of American Imperialism,” *The Journal of American History* 66, no. 4 (1980): 828-829.

established schools and colleges to educate blacks and provide them with the skills necessary to become a self-sustaining population.

The Army experimented with the use of education to pacify the American Indians and help assimilate them into society. On-site reservation schools as well as boarding schools like the one at Carlisle Barracks provided Indians with educational opportunities that would put them on intellectually equal footing as their white counterparts as well as the skills necessary to live in America's civilized society. Early on during the Philippine-American War, leaders and philanthropists cited education as the answer to the Philippine problem. In a speech on the Philippines, Morgan stated that American involvement was necessary to evolve Filipino education to a satisfactory level. Using the U.S.'s experiences assimilating the Indians, he argued, "I believe it to be the duty of the government in this hour of supreme opportunity to extend the system of education for the Indians, that has slowly grown to its present admirable proportions, to these other dependent peoples."⁶⁴

⁶⁴Thomas J. Morgan, "The Relation of the Government to Its Dependent Classes" (paper presented at the The 19th Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indian, Lake Mohonk, NY, 1901), 21-22.

CHAPTER 3

EDUCATION UNDER MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

A people who have risen in arms submit only of their own will, and only when the majority has been induced to believe that their property and their lives are safer in the hands of the leaders of the conquering army than in the hands of the leaders who have called them to the field.⁶⁵

— Captain John R. M. Taylor

When General Wesley Merritt led the U.S. VIII Army Corps into Manila in August 1898, he was concerned with more than just the presence of Spanish forces. Three months prior to the invasion, he wrote President McKinley and expressed, “It seems more than probable that we will have the so-called insurgents to fight as well as the Spaniards.”⁶⁶ In addition to the *insurrectos*, the country’s populace, of which “the majority of whom will regard us with the intense hatred born of race and religion,” also made him anxious.⁶⁷ He knew that if McKinley tasked the Army to secure the entire archipelago, and not just Manila, the situation was likely to become more complicated.

General Otis certainly found a complex situation when he replaced Merritt as the VIII Corps Commander on 29 August 1898 and shaped the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines. He understood the importance of civil

⁶⁵John R. M. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States: A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction* [hereafter noted as Taylor Comp], NAB RG 94 M 719 R 9, 58GV.

⁶⁶Wesley Merritt to William McKinley, 15 May 1898, U.S. Army Adjutant General's Office, *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain . . . April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902*. [hereafter CWS]. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), 2: 646.

⁶⁷Merritt to AG, 17 May 1898, CWS, 648.

affairs and the effect positive troop interaction could have with the population.⁶⁸ He expressed his views prior to the 1882 graduating West Point class:

Be not deceived and expect the foolish delusion . . . that the soldier's obligations only begin when summoned to meet a foreign enemy or to put down armed resistance which has overthrown civil power. . . . A soldier is now expected to exert himself within proper limits to preserve and organize peace. He should labor, in unison with the citizen and philanthropist, to impress and extend our civilization. So vast is the field of operations of our small army, and so scattered are the troops, it is possible, if not extremely probable, that in a few short years, whatever may be your age and rank, you may be obliged to administer affairs wherein considerable knowledge of civil matters may be necessary.⁶⁹

Like so many of his peers, he subscribed to the era's progressive thinking and believed that the military should spread American ideals wherever they are present. Otis embraced civic actions as a significant aspect of the Army's pacification effort. In the Philippines, this meant the building of a school system based on American ideals.⁷⁰

The U.S. Army oversaw the administration of the school system from the time it successfully occupied Manila in August 1898 until it turned over responsibility to the Taft Commission on 1 September 1900 as a way to demonstrate American goodwill. This chapter will show that in the midst of war, the Army rebuilt and expanded the primary and intermediate school system as part of its counterinsurgency strategy in the Philippines to pacify feelings of anti-U.S. sentiment among Filipinos. The Army based its strategy on the beliefs that curriculum reforms, such as the introduction of English instruction and secularization, coupled with its build-up of schools to increase Filipino

⁶⁸John Morgan Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), 82.

⁶⁹As quoted in Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*, 92.

⁷⁰Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 82.

educational opportunities throughout the archipelago, satisfied native desires for education and discredited the insurgent's narrative. A look at the history of Philippine education and the revolutionaries' highlight the background for the Filipino's desire for education.

History of Philippine Education

When the Spanish first settled the Philippines in 1565, they along brought Catholic missionaries who established and ran many of the schools within the archipelago. The Spanish settlers felt primary education was a lower priority and placed emphasis on higher institutions, such as the University of Santo Tomás.⁷¹ It was not until 20 December 1863 that Queen Isabella II of Spain issued a royal decree and established a nationalized primary school system in the Philippines. According to Spanish law, public schools were meant to be free and universal but “teachers often devoted most of their time to those whose parents paid a small fee.”⁷²

The friars held considerable power under the Spanish regime and they viewed universal education as a threat to their status. They owned much of the agricultural land and enforced rules to discriminate and oppress Filipinos.⁷³ The friars viewed “education of the common people as not only unnecessary for their salvation, but as positively

⁷¹Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Philippines: Reports Director of Education: 1899-1907* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), 727: 64-65. NACP E 95 RG 350.

⁷²University of Santo Tomás, “University of Santo Tomás,” www.ust.edu.ph/index.php/history.html (accessed 28 October 2012).

⁷³Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 8-11.

dangerous to the established order of things.”⁷⁴ Powerful and unchecked, Filipinos viewed education restrictions as a means for the friars to oppress the population, especially the lower class.

The primary education curriculum within the provincial system deviated greatly from that which Spanish laws required and contributed to the oppression of the lower class. Spanish regulations called for a curriculum made up of religious doctrine, reading and writing in the Spanish language, Spanish history, geography, agriculture, and music. However inspection of the schools were often delegated to the local priests. As such, the history lessons were often censored and only included that of Spain; geography instruction rarely included charts or maps; and music was all but ignored. Boys and girls were kept in separate classrooms and girls were taught “in employments suitable to their sex,” thus geography, history, and agriculture were stricken from their instruction in place of classes such as cooking and sewing.⁷⁵ For both sexes, the priests placed the heaviest emphasis on religious instruction and conducted classes in the local dialect. The refusal to teach Spanish did not allow lower class citizens to communicate with those in power and became another example of the friars’ oppression. Private and religious affiliated schools, which were run much differently than the public schools, were designed to prepare students for the next level of education.⁷⁶ Schools such as the

⁷⁴Charles B. Elliott, *The Philippines: To the End of the Commission Government* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1917), 220.

⁷⁵U.S. Philippine Commission, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, January 31, 1900* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900), 30-31.

⁷⁶Ibid., 30-32.

Anteneo Municipal in Manila, run by the Jesuits, often met or exceeded the Spanish curriculum regulations. Higher education remained a luxury for those who could afford it; the system widened the gap between the educated elite, the *ilustrados*, and the rest of the population.⁷⁷

Cause of the Insurrection

Filipinos' desire for independence started in the 1870s among the *ilustrados*. Recognizing the unacceptable conditions within the country, the *ilustrados* demanded reforms within the country as a means of limiting the power of the Governor-General, such as additional education opportunities, and the expulsion of the friars. In 1892, Filipino dissidents established a secret society called the Katipunan to prepare for a revolution with the hopes of Philippine independence. Under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, the Katipunans revolted against the Spanish regime in the Philippines in 1896. Fighting lasted a year, with neither side having a distinct advantage over the other.⁷⁸

In December 1897, the Spaniards and revolutionaries met at the negotiating table and signed the Pact of Biac-na-Botó. Under the terms of the pact, Aguinaldo and the other revolutionary leaders were to call for an end to the revolution and retreat into exile to Hong Kong. In return, the Spanish government was to pay the revolutionary leaders 800,000 pesos over multiple installments based on terms of the pact having been met. Additionally, the Spanish government promised amnesty to revolutionaries inside the

⁷⁷Constantino, "The Mis-Education of the Filipino," 438; Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 10. *Ilustrados* translates into English as the enlightened ones.

⁷⁸Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 10-14.

islands. The desired reforms, which sparked the revolution and the genesis of the Katipunan society, were never part of the agreement.⁷⁹

As tensions flared between the U.S. and Spain in the spring of 1898, the Katipunans sought assistance from the U.S. to help free them from Spanish rule. Admiral George Dewey, Commander of the Naval Fleet in Manila, met with Aguinaldo in May and arranged for Aguinaldo's transportation to the Philippines. There, Aguinaldo raised a revolutionary army with a strength of approximately 10,000 men. The revolutionary forces successfully cut the Spanish lines of communication and confined the Spanish troops to the walled city of Manila. Thinking he had gained American support, he quickly established a rudimentary government and, on 23 May 1898, declared himself dictator with a promise to establish a democratic government. In June, Aguinaldo established an electorate process to create a provincial assembly who would then choose a governor. However, Aguinaldo limited the electorate through land ownership requirements in order to keep power to those people "most characterized by their education, their social position, and their honorable conduct," and, in turn, attempted to create an aristocratic form of government in the islands.⁸⁰

McKinley did not support Aguinaldo's revolutionary government. He had not made up his mind on what the American policy towards the islands would be. One thing was clear: the revolutionary government could limit McKinley's options and posed a risk to the possibility of American annexation of the Philippines. On 13 August, the U.S.

⁷⁹Ibid., 7-14.

⁸⁰Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 20-21. Dewey's interactions with Aguinaldo can be found in Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 15-18.

captured Manila without the help of Aguinaldo's forces and did not allow any of the revolutionaries to enter into the walled city. McKinley demanded Merritt and Otis keep Aguinaldo and his forces at arm's length. Merritt received a message from the Adjutant General's Office which stated, "The President directs that there must be no joint occupation with the insurgents. . . . The insurgents and all others must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the President."⁸¹ Aguinaldo's hopes of American support for his newly found government diminished and tensions rose between the American and Filipino revolutionary forces.

McKinley envisioned the Philippines as a colony for the U.S. and denied support for the revolutionaries. Along with other expansionists such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt, he saw the Philippines as an opportunity to extend America's political and economic reach.⁸² McKinley and his staff debated on the future of the Philippine Islands but reports from the Philippines clouded his awareness of the situation. McKinley's staff received messages from both Otis and Dewey which stated information such as, "General anarchy prevails without the limits of the city and bay of Manila. Natives appear unable to govern," and, "[We] Do not anticipate trouble with insurgents. . . . Affairs progressing favorably."⁸³ Messages such as these led McKinley to believe that Filipinos would readily accept American governance once they witnessed the superiority

⁸¹As quoted in Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 21.

⁸²Ibid., 24.

⁸³As quoted in Blount, *The American Occupation of the Philippines*, 130-31.

of American society. He decided to make U.S. possession of the archipelago terms of the peace agreement with Spain.⁸⁴

On 10 December 1898, the U.S. and Spain signed the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War and transferred sovereignty of the Philippines to the U.S. for twenty million dollars.⁸⁵ Soon after the treaty was signed, McKinley transmitted his intentions for the American occupation of the islands in his “Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation” where he stated:

It will be the duty of the commander of forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends. . . . it should be the earnest wish and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that . . . the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation”⁸⁶

McKinley’s proclamation provided the military direction on how to conduct their counter-insurgency campaign. The message focused on civil actions and did not discuss much in regards to his expectation of how the U.S. should conduct themselves militarily. In fact, McKinley included only a small blurb which stated that those who do not cooperate with the U.S. “will be brought within the lawful rule . . . with firmness if need be, but without severity, so far as possible.”⁸⁷ The proclamation clearly rejected Aguinaldo’s claims of Philippine sovereignty and the end state the revolutionaries had fought for during the past quarter of a century.

⁸⁴For a good explanation of the discussions leading up to McKinley’s intent to annex the Philippines from Spain, see Ibid., 121-38.

⁸⁵Ibid., 138.

⁸⁶As quoted in Ibid., 149.

⁸⁷As quoted in Ibid., 148.

The announcement made war between the U.S. and the revolutionaries inevitable. McKinley misread Filipino attitudes towards the U.S. and believed the tensions between the two forces would subside. Barely a month after the treaty was signed, he spoke of the opportunity afforded to the Philippine people stating, “The treaty now commits the free and unfranchised Filipinos to the guiding hand and liberalizing influence, the generous sympathies, the uplifting education, not of their American masters, but of their American emancipators.”⁸⁸ In January 1898, tensions were at its tipping point. McKinley advised Otis that “Time given the insurgents cannot injure us, and must weaken and discourage them. They will see our benevolent purposes.”⁸⁹ He believed that time was on the American’s side and only provided more opportunity for the insurgents to recognize American goodwill.

McKinley did not understand the magnitude of the tensions between the American and revolutionary forces. Skirmishes between the two forces were a common occurrence. So common, in fact, that it took cannon fire for one officer to realize that war broke out on 4 February 1898.⁹⁰ Otis faced the complex problem of fighting a war while adhering to the President’s direction. In answer, Otis continued the challenging task of building up the country’s primary school system in order to win over the population’s support.

⁸⁸Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Reports on the Law of Civil Government in Territory Subject to Military Occupation by the Military Forces of the United States, Submitted to Hon. Elihu Root, Secretary of War*, by Charles Edward Magoon, 2d ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), 66.

⁸⁹U.S. War Department, *Annual Report of Department of the Pacific and 8th Army Corps, Military Governor in the Philippine Islands* (Manila: 1899), 132.

⁹⁰Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 37.

Building Up Schools

The state of the Philippine schools was deplorable prior to the American occupation. Most of the public schools in the islands closed as a result of the 1896 Filipino revolution against the Spanish. Former schoolhouses became barracks or hospitals, while others were damaged or destroyed in the fighting. In addition to the physical degradation of the schoolhouses, students within the more remote areas of the islands still used antiquated materials—sharp sticks, bamboo stems, and banana leaves as writing materials.⁹¹ Teachers were also scarce. Despite Spanish law which required one male and female teacher per 5,000 inhabitants, U.S. officials found only 1,914 teachers in the islands; a ratio of one teacher for every 4,179 inhabitants. In addition, many of the teachers found were “assistants” or “temporary incumbents.”⁹²

The U.S. administered the school system to its advantage immediately after the occupation of Manila. After the city fell to the Americans, Merritt’s terms of capitulation stated, “This city, its inhabitants . . . its educational establishments . . . are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American Army.”⁹³ Father W.D. McKinnon, Chaplain of the First California Volunteers, initially carried out this task. In doing so, he took charge of the city’s public primary schools.⁹⁴ Despite having only

⁹¹Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Philippines: Reports Director of Education: 1899-1907*, 64-65. NACP E 95 RG 350.

⁹²U.S. Philippine Commission, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, January 31, 1900*, 17-18 and 33.

⁹³Wesley Merritt to AG, 20 August 1898, United States Adjutant General’s Office, CWS, 2:757.

⁹⁴US War Department, *Report of the War Department, 1899: Report of the Major-General Commanding the Army*, 1:271. The orders tasking Chaplain McKinnon as

limited school administration experience, two years teaching at the Ottawa Seminary School and five years as the Superintendent of St. Vincent's Orphanage in the U.S., McKinnon proved to be a good choice as superintendent.⁹⁵ He wasted no time and, within the first week of September, reopened seven schools in Manila.⁹⁶

McKinnon did not have an extensive educational administration background, but his initiative, bravery, and character offset his lack of experience. In an occasion prior to the city's siege, he demonstrated his character and gained the admiration of his leaders. Wanting to avoid a bloody battle, McKinnon used his credentials as a Catholic priest to negotiate a Spanish surrender. Unarmed, he tried to cross an 800 yard gap between the American and Spanish trenches. At first, a volley of Spanish bullets forced him to turn back but he tried the crossing again, this time only a single Spanish shot was fired. The bullet pierced his hat but he kept moving forward. Unexplainably, the Spanish troops did not fire any more shots. He reached the Spanish trenches and, with the help of Manila Archbishop Bernardino Nozaleda, secured a meeting with Spanish Captain-General Fermin Jáundenes. Unfortunately, the Captain-General indicated his need to show a good fight prior to his surrender and the two could not reach a peaceful settlement. However,

Superintendent of Schools were verbal, hence, there is no evidence of the exact date. Mention of these verbal orders were made in correspondence between MG Otis and the Adjutant Generals's Office when the War Department inquired on 4 March 1899 if a superintended had been appointed, Henry Corbin to Elwell Otis, 4 March 1899; and Otis to Corbin, 5 March 1899, all in CWS, 923.

⁹⁵V. Edmund McDevitt, *The First California's Chaplain: The Story of the Heroic Chaplain of the First California Volunteers During the Spanish-American War* (Fresno: Academy Library Guild, 1956), 100.

⁹⁶U.S. Bureau of Education, *Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1900-1901* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), 1322.

McKinnon's efforts were a partial success as it led to discussions between Dewey and Jáundenes, which facilitated a quick Spanish surrender.⁹⁷

As an administrator, McKinnon primarily focused on opening schools within Manila. After the Army entered Manila, they found "about 30 primary schools" within the city.⁹⁸ Records prior to the siege indicated the schools within Manila had roughly five thousand students in attendance, however, the situation in the islands since the 1896 revolution reduced primary school attendance to roughly one hundred students by the time American forces entered the town. McKinnon found buildings within the city to use as temporary schoolhouses until he could secure more permanent facilities. In addition, he also located and rehired many of the former teachers. During his ten month tenure as superintendent, McKinnon opened a total of thirty-two schools in Manila and increased primary school attendance within the city to 3,742 pupils.⁹⁹ The Army's next step was to expand its efforts to build schools outside the area of Manila and where it could in the archipelago.

The Army integrated its efforts to build schools with the establishment of municipal governments throughout the islands. Commanders such as Colonel William Kobbé viewed a functioning local government, which included active schools, as essential to a town's long term security. Kobbé commanded the Third Artillery which

⁹⁷ McDevitt, *The First California's Chaplain: The Story of the Heroic Chaplain of the First California Volunteers During the Spanish-American War*, 93-96.

⁹⁸ Philippine Exposition Board, *Official Handbook of the Philippines and Catalogue of the Philippine Exhibit* (Manila: Bureau of Public Printing, 1903), 1:213.

⁹⁹ United States Bureau of Education, *Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1900-1901*, 1322.

secured the lines of communication along the Manila-San-Fernando Railroad and planned to build up municipal governments in the major towns within his jurisdiction.¹⁰⁰ He called for the elections of a municipal council with a *presidente*, or mayor, to administer the affairs of the town so that, “To the end that peace and tranquility prevail and that equality before the law be established . . . to permit all inhabitants to devote themselves to their accustomed civil pursuits and to reopen churches and schools . . . to render life, property, and individual liberty secure.”¹⁰¹ Kobbé stressed the importance of civil actions to his subordinates. In response to a native’s question regarding the Army’s expectation of municipal governments, one of his officers simply replied, “Cleanliness and schools is all we want.”¹⁰²

Kobbé’s orders delegated the responsibility for school establishment to the natives within the municipal governments. The order called for the Municipal Council “to establish schools” sustained from municipal revenues such as taxes and rents.¹⁰³ General MacArthur, in charge of the area north of Manila, was initially wary of the plan and “thought they were almost too elaborate,” but Otis thought different and lauded Kobbé’s plan as a “model for municipal government.”¹⁰⁴ The plan became the basis for Otis’

¹⁰⁰Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 130.

¹⁰¹U.S. Army. Headquarters U.S. Troops Guarding Railroad, “Circular Letter,” 8 August 1899. Kobbé Papers, MHI B 3.

¹⁰²As quoted in Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 231.

¹⁰³U.S. Army. HQ U.S. Troops Guarding Railroad, “Orders, No. 2,” 31 July 1899. Kobbé Papers, MHI B 3.

¹⁰⁴Otis to Kobbé, 1 August 1899; Otis to MacArthur, 31 July 1899. Kobbé Papers, MHI B 2.

General Order 43 issued on 8 August 1899 which extended the provisions of Kobbé's orders to all towns occupied by American forces.

In accordance with General Order 43, as the Army's reach in the islands expanded, it set up municipal governments which helped foster the establishment of schools throughout the archipelago.¹⁰⁵ As one former soldier stated, "public schools were established in the larger garrisoned towns by the voluntary efforts of sub-commanding officers . . . nearly every case very soon after these towns had been captured from the *insurrecto* army."¹⁰⁶ According to a contemporary report, once U.S. soldiers occupied new areas, the "inhabitants expressed the same desire for primary-school teaching as had been manifested in Manila."¹⁰⁷ Elected Filipinos also recognized the importance of schools; in Southern Luzon, the *presidentes*, approved an early start to the school year.¹⁰⁸ In addition to the increase of schools throughout the archipelago, the Army implemented school reforms which helped increase Filipino popular support for the Americans.

School Reform

McKinnon wanted to emulate the American public school system, and as such, secularized the primary and intermediate schools in Manila. In doing so, he eliminated all religious instruction from their curriculum. Notwithstanding, the directive did not

¹⁰⁵U.S. Army. HQ Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, "General Orders, No. 43," 8 August 1899. Kobbé Papers, MHI B 3.

¹⁰⁶David Gibbs, "Soldier Schools in the Philippines," *The Outlook*, 30 May 1903, 278.

¹⁰⁷Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Philippines: Reports, Director of Education: 1899-1907*, 125. NACP E 95 RG 350.

¹⁰⁸Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 284.

completely ban religious instruction, nor completely remove religious influence from education. McKinnon allowed priests to continue religious education at the parents' discretion and with the stipulation that instruction occurred outside normal school hours.¹⁰⁹ Since the Army focused on primary education, Catholic Priests continued to oversee the secondary and higher educational institutions. Regardless of their remaining influence over the later stages of education, Filipinos, including the nationalists, saw the secularization of schools as part of their desire to reduce the friar's stronghold over the population; McKinnon's actions raised the population's support of American sovereignty in the Philippines.¹¹⁰

McKinnon also introduced English instruction into the curriculum at the start of the occupation. This was due, no doubt, as a result of the progressive views of many officers which viewed the English language as a shortcut to civilization and prosperity. In addition, the Army believed that a common language between the population and government would "prevent distrusts and misunderstandings, which must ever exist where the rulers and the ruled have diverse speech."¹¹¹ However, the introduction of English into the curriculum was difficult. Most of the teachers only spoke the town's native language and what Spanish they could speak was mainly limited to memorization

¹⁰⁹ McDevitt, *The First California's Chaplain: The Story of the Heroic Chaplain of the First California Volunteers During the Spanish-American War*, 101.

¹¹⁰ Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 61.

¹¹¹ U.S. Army. Military Governor of the Philippines, *Annual Report of the Military Governor in the Philippine Islands, 1900* (Manila: Government Printing Office, 1900), 2:346.

of textbooks.¹¹² As such, with the exception of the English lessons, native teachers continued to conduct classes in a mixture of the area's native language and Spanish, just as they had done prior to the American occupation. McKinnon relied on soldiers to fill the role of English teachers and assigned one per school in Manila.¹¹³

Commanders throughout the islands often relied on soldiers as teachers to help meet the native's demand for English instruction. While some military officers did not agree with the use of soldiers in this manner, this line of thinking was rare.¹¹⁴ Most, like Major Henry T. Allen, saw the benefits of the Army's involvement in schools. Detailing his landing on the island of Samar on 27 January 1900 and the capture of the port city of Catbalogan, he wrote of his intentions with respect to schools, stating:

It is now my earnest [sic] effort to impress upon the various towns the importance of schools, in which the leading people seem to fully concur but the absence of teachers is a great obstacle. Perhaps, later American teachers may be induced to locate to this island. If not, then I should desire to use duly qualified soldiers to supplement the native teachers.¹¹⁵

Since the issuance of General Order 43, the Army worked to establish schools in the American occupied towns. As such, the use of soldier-teachers proliferated. As one

¹¹²U.S. Bureau of Education, *Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1900-1901*, 1318.

¹¹³Bureau of Insular Affairs, Philippines: Reports, Director of Education: 1899-1907, 65. NACP E 95 RG 350.

¹¹⁴Excerpts from responses to Captain Todd's circular are found in U.S. Army, Annual Report of the Military Governor in the Philippine Islands, 1900, 2:350-376. Almost every report discussed the need for more English instructors and very few were against utilizing soldiers in this manner.

¹¹⁵Henry Allen to the AG Provisional Brigade, 10 February, 1900. Henry T. Allen Papers [hereafter HTA], MDLC B 32.

former American soldier described, “there were soldier teachers in nearly every army post in the islands.”¹¹⁶

The natives enthusiastically accepted English instruction. One former soldier-teacher recalled that in his school, “Every available bit of space around the door and window openings was occupied by the parents of children, and the dark brown face of the adult native parent peered into the school room, expressing surprise, astonishment, and pleasure.”¹¹⁷ He also spoke of native teachers’ enthusiasm to learn English, writing “after finishing with their pupils they would detain me with some lesson in English they had worked out for themselves for my correction or criticism.”¹¹⁸ Adults within the towns were also eager to learn. Secretary of War Elihu Root stated in his 1901 annual report that as many as ten thousand adults attended night schools in order to learn English.¹¹⁹

As the Army occupied more cities and towns, it had trouble supplying English teachers for every school. Commanders such as General J.F. Bell, in the Third District within the Department of Northern Luzon, thought, “The study of the English language should be begun in all towns without delay.”¹²⁰ However, the Army could not supply the

¹¹⁶Gibbs, “Soldier Schools in the Philippines,” 278.

¹¹⁷Anon, “The Soldier Teacher in the Philippines,” *Harper’s Weekly* 46, no. 18 (January 1902). M, no. 1496, Reel 21, 74.

¹¹⁸Ibid.

¹¹⁹U.S. War Department, “The Civil Government of the Philippines,” Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 1901, in *The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States: Addresses and Reports by Elihu Root*, ed. Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916), 272.

¹²⁰U.S. Army, Annual Report of the Military Governor in the Philippine Islands, 1900, 2:353.

number of English teachers to meet the demand of the population. Brigadier General Samuel B.M. Young requested seventy-five English teachers for his district alone. In the province of Bulacan, First Lieutenant Russell C. Langdon complained that “Teachers of English cannot be supplied in this locality.”¹²¹ The lack of teachers became one of the main obstacles to English instruction in the islands.

In addition to the lack of teachers, the Army had to cope with the lack of supplies in the classrooms. Municipal governments neglected the public school system since the 1896 insurrection. Consequently, a vast amount of student supplies and school furniture were lost or stolen.¹²² It was common for classrooms to lack essential materials for class instruction. A former American teacher described his classroom which, “consisted of a table, one chair, and a rattan pointer, the children finding seats as best they could. . . . we had no blackboards, no charts, no books, no slates, no pencils.”¹²³ His account was not uncommon. When the Spaniards departed the islands, they left behind an insufficient quantity of old books needed for a robust educational system. U.S. personnel counted only 1,714 math books; 3,140 books on hygiene; 7,485 generic primary instruction books; and 8,326 books on the metric system present in the islands after the Spanish left, an insufficient total for a population of eight million people. However, there were 17,360 books on religious instruction, reflecting the friars’ emphasis on the subject.¹²⁴

¹²¹Ibid., 354, 350.

¹²²Dorothy Della Swendiman, “The Development of Education in the Philippine Islands Since 1898” (Master’s Thesis, Duke University, 1942), 4.

¹²³Anon, “The Soldier Teacher in the Philippines,” M, no. 1496, Reel 21, 74.

¹²⁴U.S. Army, *Annual Report of the Military Governor in the Philippine Islands, 1900*, 2:347-48.

Along with the lack of resources, the quality of native instruction was extremely poor. Native teachers stressed memorization as the preferred method of instruction. Students answered their instructors “like phonographs . . . without seeming to have thought for themselves.”¹²⁵ Officers viewed the schools as “shallow, unpracticable [sic], and not suited to fit the graduates for the problems devolving upon them in this period of renaissance in the Philippines.”¹²⁶ The problems within the schools were common throughout the islands, and the military needed to centralize its efforts if it wanted to create a robust system of instruction.

From the outset of the occupation, much of the Army’s educational work was decentralized. District commanders assigned officers as superintendents for the schools within their geographical areas. Despite the Army’s efforts, the school system within the islands was, in general, in a “chaotic condition.”¹²⁷ The Army established the Department of Public Instruction on 30 March 1900 under the direction of Captain Albert Todd to coordinate the educational work throughout the archipelago.¹²⁸ MacArthur, who succeeded Otis in May 1900, stressed the importance of the new department’s mission:

I know of nothing in the department of administration that can contribute more in behalf of pacification than the immediate institution of a comprehensive system of education. The matter is so closely allied to the exercise of military force in these

¹²⁵A quoted in May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913*, 78.

¹²⁶Henry Allen to AAG First Visayan District, 6 September 1900, HTA, MDLC B 32.

¹²⁷U.S. Bureau of Education, *Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1900-1901*, 1320.

¹²⁸U.S. Army, *Annual Report of the Military Governor in the Philippine Islands, 1900*, 2:343.

islands that in my annual report I treated the matter as a military subject and suggested a rapid extension of educational facilities as an exclusively military measure.¹²⁹

One of Todd's primary efforts became the acquisition and distribution of school materials.

The Army purchased textbooks and supplies from companies in the States to supplement the old books left behind and meet the demands of the newly formed U.S. educational system. By June 1900, the Army purchased over 60,000 English textbooks, 13,500 Spanish history textbooks, and 13,500 Philippine geography textbooks to supplement those previously used within the schools. In addition to the textbooks, the department procured supplies such as chalk, pencils, pens, erasers, and charts. Todd distributed the supplies to various schools throughout the islands. In total, the Army spent and distributed 104,251 dollars on textbooks and school supplies within the first two years of the Philippine campaign.¹³⁰

As part of the effort to centralize the school system, the Todd solicited information and recommendations from commanders regarding the educational conditions within their areas of responsibility. He requested data on such items as to the number of schools, the number of students and teachers, and the quality of schoolhouses within the commanders' jurisdiction. The replies were consistent across the districts and departments: school materials were insufficient, English should be the primary mode of instruction, and there was a vast shortage of English teachers. In addition, many officers

¹²⁹ As quoted in Paulet, "To Change the World: The Use of American Indian Education in the Philippines," 183.

¹³⁰ U.S. Army, *Annual Report of the Military Governor in the Philippine Islands, 1900*, 2:347-48, and 37.

felt the gross underpayment of native teachers and lack of funds within the municipal governments negatively affected the military's educational efforts.¹³¹

Todd's work provided the Philippine Commission a foundation for educational reform. In addition to the collection of information and suggestions from commanders, he also solicited the superintendents of Public Instruction from various cities and states within the U.S. for information. Todd used this information to create a file that would help in the establishment of a more formal educational system. He also crafted recommendations for future reforms, which served as a basis for the Commission's efforts:

1. That a comprehensive modern school system, for the teaching of elementary English, be inaugurated at the earliest possible moment, and that attendance be made compulsory wherever practicable.
2. That industrial schools for manual training be established as soon as a fair knowledge of English has been acquired.
3. That all the schools under Government control be practicable, and that the use of Spanish or the dialects be only for a period of transition.
4. That English teachers well trained in primary instruction be brought over from the United States in sufficient numbers to take charge of the schools in larger towns at least.
5. That a well equipped Normal school be established for instructing natives to become teachers of English.
6. That in the larger towns, a portion at least of the schoolhouses be modern structures, plainly, but well and properly equipped.
7. That the schools supported by the government be absolutely divorced from the church. If the natives desire schools in which religious instruction is to be given, that they furnish the entire support for same from private resources, but that attendance at these latter schools shall not excuse the children from attendance at

¹³¹ Reports from many of the commanding officers in answer to Captain Todd's circular are found in *Ibid.*, 349-76.

the public schools, where English is taught. In addition, the parochial church schools, if such are maintained, shall be required to be equal in character of general instruction to the public schools.¹³²

Like many of his superiors, Todd recognized the positive effects school reform had on the population and the insurgency. In the same report, he wrote, “I am well aware that some of these recommendations imply the expenditure of considerable sums of public money, but I can think of no expenditure which will have a greater influence in developing peace and progress in these islands than public schools.”¹³³

Winning Over the Population

The Army felt that if the natives realized the U.S.’s benevolent intentions the Filipinos would eventually accept American presence. One officer wrote that “it seemed common sense that if we could get the natives to understand that the U.S. government would provide their security and a promise of prosperity, many who were sensible might be induced to cast their lot with us, rather than with the insurgents.”¹³⁴ MacArthur saw the U.S.’s efforts to provide natives with additional educational opportunities and the Filipino’s desire to learn as “a fortunate co-incidence of American interests and Filipino aspirations which in this important particular come into complete and harmonious focus,” and suggested “that the archipelago be submerged immediately under a tidal wave of

¹³²Ibid., 345-46.

¹³³Ibid., 346.

¹³⁴Unknown to Kobbé, 3 May 1899. Kobbé Papers, MHI B 2. The signature of the originator is indecipherable. The letter discusses the author’s experience in Malabon. The letter suggests this information was provided to Kobbé at his request.

education.”¹³⁵ Education became a way for the Army to counter the *insurrectos*’ efforts to sway popular support away from U.S. presence, as well as some of its own missteps.

Occasionally soldiers mistreated Filipinos and their property, negatively affecting native support for the American effort. A central factor in the maltreatment of Filipinos was the feeling of racial superiority among some of the American soldiers. A diary of one soldier illustrated the racial superiority many soldiers felt towards the Filipinos. He filled the entries with disparaging remarks such as “Friday we (40 of us) hiked out through San Tomas looking for a bunch of niggers reported to be gathering out that way,” while another detailed an expedition to “go nigger hunting.”¹³⁶ Another soldier described similar sentiments in a letter home, writing that “If they would turn the boys loose there wouldint [sic] be a nigger left in Manila twelve hours after. . . .The niggers will find out after [a] while they are not fooling with the Spaniards.”¹³⁷ On occasion, racial sentiments spilled over into violent actions such as the shooting of prisoners and civilians. In addition to the feelings and actions spawned from racism, soldiers also defaced private property, stole religious articles from churches, and looted from towns.¹³⁸

The *insurrectos* used propaganda to help fuel the insurgency. Insurgents built upon the Spanish propaganda which referenced the U.S. treatment of blacks and

¹³⁵“U.S. Army, *Annual Report of the Military Governor in the Philippine Islands, 1900*, 1:8.

¹³⁶Karl D. White, 26 November 1899 and 24 May 1900. *Transcription of Philippine Insurrection Diaries of Karl D. White Company K, 32nd Volunteer Infantry, 1899-1901* [Hereafter KDW], CARL.

¹³⁷As quoted in Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 36.

¹³⁸For more information on American maltreatment of Filipinos, see Ibid., 36-37, 64, 123-25.

American Indians as proof the U.S. only wanted to enslave the Filipinos.¹³⁹ A group known as the Hong Kong Junta published propaganda throughout the islands to discredit the Americans.¹⁴⁰ They told the natives that the U.S. desired to “treat the noble sons of the country as they do the ‘colored gentlemen’ of the United States. To the Yankees you are only a ‘nigger’.”¹⁴¹ In some cases, the insurgent propaganda successfully instilled fear among the natives, especially to those who did not interact with Americans. Major Allen highlighted people’s fears in one of his reports stating that, in areas where Filipinos did not have a chance to interact with Americans, “Prominent and intelligent natives have modestly assured me that they feared the Americans as barbarians.”¹⁴²

In addition to anti-U.S. propaganda, Aguinaldo’s forces used politics and terror to influence the general population. They established shadow governments within towns and created a system to recruit forces to sustain their guerrilla efforts. The revolutionary governments were often in opposition to the municipal governments the Americans

¹³⁹Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 31-32.

¹⁴⁰The Katipunan revolutionary leaders, who were exiled to Hong Kong as a result of the Pact of Biac-na-Botó, formed what was known as The Hong Kong Junta. During the Philippine-American War, their efforts consisted mostly of propaganda directed towards the natives to persuading Filipinos to continue the revolutionary cause for independence and reduce support for the Americans by describing the ills of the American intentions. The National Historic Commission briefly details information on the Junta os found in: National Historical Commission of the Philippines, “The Hong Kong Junta,” http://www.nhcp.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=507&Itemid=3 (accessed 2 December 2012).

¹⁴¹U.S. Army, *Annual Report of Department of the Pacific and 8th Army Corps, Military Governor in the Philippine Islands* (Manila: 1899), 271.

¹⁴²Henry Allen to AG Military District of Albany, Cantanduanas, etc., 31 March 1900, HTA, MDLC B32.

established, and in some instances, the same people staffed the two governments.¹⁴³

Insurgents threatened to fine or kill those who supported the Americans. General José Alejandrino, Commander of insurgent forces within the Pampanga Province of Luzon, issued a General Order in September 1900 which punished anyone who held “an official position or who may have contributed materially to the establishment of the pretended American Civil Government.”¹⁴⁴

The Army needed to find balance between the use of force and benevolent actions to combat insurgent efforts to sway public opinion within the islands. Speaking of this delicate balance, Allen wrote to the Adjutant General in May 1900 stating:

Wherever there is anything to attack, it must be forcefully done, but the most beneficial and lasting efforts will proceed by dissemination from large centers properly administered where influential and other natives may be thoroughly convinced that honest American rule is for their best interest.¹⁴⁵

Balance came in the form of the commanders’ use of education in their pacification efforts. Colonel Edmund Rice, the 26th Infantry Commander, stated that, “Model school buildings thoroughly equipped with books, pictures, maps, globes, etc., which have so long been denied to the Filipino, will have an influence not securable by force of arms.”¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³Linn, “Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1901: The First District Department of Northern Luzon,” 63.

¹⁴⁴John R. M. Taylor, *Taylor Comp*, NAB RG 94 M 719 R 9, 58GV. The orders call for the punishment of a fine not less than 100 dollars or death, depending on the severity of the action.

¹⁴⁵Allen to AG Military District of Albany, Cantanduanas, etc., 31 March 1900, HTA, MDLC B 32.

¹⁴⁶U.S. Army, *Annual Report of the Military Governor in the Philippine Islands, 1900*, 2:366.

Schoolhouses acted as Allen's "centers" which raised the population's support for the American cause. American flags flew in the classrooms and teachers taught American values and patriotism to gain Filipino support. On occasions, schoolchildren marched and sang patriotic songs such as "Red, White, and Blue" and the "Star Spangled Banner."¹⁴⁷ As one former soldier and school superintendent wrote, schools "were very important in securing the good will of the people."¹⁴⁸ This feeling also extended to much of the American leadership. Colonel Arthur Murray, Commander of the 43rd Infantry, thought the "proper fostering of the schools of the island will prove one of the potent factors in securing the friendship of the natives."¹⁴⁹ Town leaders recognized schools as a means to attract more residents to the area. An officer under Murray's command credited the school as part of the reason for the population growth in one of the towns the Americans controlled.¹⁵⁰ The soldier-teacher also played an important role in the swaying of native's support towards the Americans. Brigadier General J.F. Smith, Commander of the 3rd District in Negros, highlighted the same sentiment in his report stating, "the soldier instructor is able to satisfy some of the [native's] craving for knowledge and is a potent factor in bringing the lower classes . . . into more cordial relations with Americans."¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷White, 22 November 1900, KDW, CARL.

¹⁴⁸Gibbs, "Soldier Schools in the Philippines," 279.

¹⁴⁹As quoted in Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 237.

¹⁵⁰Ibid.

¹⁵¹U.S. Army, Annual Report of the Military Governor in the Philippine Islands, 1900, 2:365.

Insurgents felt the sting from America's efforts to win over the population through education and the American policy of attraction. The positive relationship Americans cultivated with the natives worried insurgent leaders. In one town that Murray's 43rd Infantry controlled, an insurgent "complained that the population denounced guerrillas and assisted soldiers on patrols."¹⁵² In another area, Colonel R.F. Santos, a commander within Aguinaldo's army, issued a circular which prevented his insurgent soldiers to enter into the towns and former homes unless absolutely necessary since "their continuous contact with our enemies may cause the gravest damage to our sacred cause, as by their policy of attraction the enemy by their craft may easily attract them."¹⁵³

Thinking that the war was almost over, the U.S. began transitioning power from the military to civilian authorities. McKinley appointed William Howard Taft to lead the Philippine Commission and assume the task of establishing a civilian government in the Philippines.¹⁵⁴ On 1 September 1900, the Department of Public Instruction moved under the authority of the Commission. Immediately, the purpose of education shifted from that of pacification to a goal of social reform. In its report, the Commission stated that a "well-directed system of education will prove one of the most forceful agencies for elevating Filipinos, materially, socially, and morally, and preparing them for large participation in the affairs of government."¹⁵⁵

¹⁵²Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 237.

¹⁵³Taylor Comp, NAB RG 94 M 719 R 9, 58GV.

¹⁵⁴Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 216.

¹⁵⁵Ibid.

After the military transferred responsibility for school administration to the Commission, MacArthur adjusted the Army's pacification strategy. The insurgents' use of terror proved effective as a means to influence natives to provide them aid. As MacArthur described it, the natives "looked upon the lenient attitude of the United States as indicating conscious weakness."¹⁵⁶ In answer, he issued a proclamation on 20 December 1900 to the people of the islands which implemented measures to sternly punish insurgents and civilians "who do things inimical to the interests of the occupying army."¹⁵⁷ MacArthur intended the proclamation to severely punish those who supported the insurgency for any reason. However, even during the new strategy, commanders still stressed civic actions and the importance of schools. In March 1901, General Bell boasted of his unit's efforts to establish fifty schools which hosted twelve thousand students in the Camarines and, from his observations, increased support for the Americans.¹⁵⁸

Conclusion

The Army formulated its involvement in the Philippine school system to aid in its pacification of the islands. McKinley's Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation tied in nicely with the Army's ongoing efforts in Manila and provided Otis with direction on how to formulate his strategy to pacify the islands. From the beginning of the American occupation, the U.S. Army realized it could not secure the will of the population through

¹⁵⁶U.S. Army, *Annual Report of the Military Governor in the Philippine Islands, 1900*, 1:5.

¹⁵⁷Ibid., 7.

¹⁵⁸Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 284.

force alone. The Army used education as a means to demonstrate American goodwill to pacify the native population and deny popular support to the enemy.

As the Army expanded its reach in the islands, it established schools in the areas it occupied. Commanders such as Kobbé and Otis saw the value of education in its ability to affect long-term security, and as such, directed municipal governments must establish schools in their areas. Officers and natives shared in this belief and Filipinos were happy at the chance for their children to receive an education. Between 1898 and 1900, the military opened roughly one thousand schools in the archipelago.¹⁵⁹

In addition to the build-up of schools, the Army instituted reforms which natives widely accepted. School administrators modeled the American school system as a basis for some of the reforms, especially the secularization of the curriculum. The Army eliminated religious instruction and religious influence from the primary school curriculum. Filipinos viewed the Catholic Church's involvement in public education as a way for the friars to oppress the lower class and, as such, the Army's removal of priests from school administration positions greatly increased support for the American cause.

In addition to eliminating religious instruction from the curriculum, the Army began to teach natives the English language. Commanders recognized the importance of connecting with the population and tasked soldiers to teach English within the schools. The natives were enthusiastic about learning English. Often, schools were packed with on-lookers as the students learned the new language. Native teachers and parents also

¹⁵⁹Bureau of Insular Affairs, Philippines: Reports, Director of Education: 1899-1907, 66. NACP E 95 RG 350.

expressed desires to learn English, and teacher-soldiers had to split their time between children and adults.

The soldier-teacher became an important medium to gain the support of the population. Despite reports of atrocities and derogatory interactions between soldiers and Filipinos, Army teachers often fostered a sense of trust with the natives and support for American intentions increased. Soldier-teachers provided constant interactions with the population, which relieved native fears of American barbarity. The Commission's report describes the Army's efforts best:

The standards of American civilization were set before the natives at an early date. They were astounded that in the midst of war the American Army displayed such a genuine interest in the affairs of education. The schools were everywhere received with interest, the bitterness engendered by war softened, and the foundations laid for the more systemic work which followed under civil rule.¹⁶⁰

The Army laid the foundation for the civilian government, under the Philippine Commission, to evolve the education system and prepare the Filipino for self-government.

¹⁶⁰Ibid., 69.

CHAPTER 4

EDUCATION FOR SELF-GOVERNANCE

If properly managed . . . the bureau of education can be more beneficial than troops in preventing future revolutions.¹⁶¹

— Major Cornelius Gardener

In January 1899, President McKinley appointed an educator, Mr. Jacob Schurman, to head the commission which would investigate the state of the Philippines and advise him “of the necessary steps to be taken for the organization of a civil government.”¹⁶² A year later, the Schurman Committee reported back to McKinley with their findings and recommendations. In their report, the Committee stated “that the fitness of any people to maintain a popular form of government must be closely dependent on the prevalence of knowledge and enlightenment among the masses.”¹⁶³ Firsthand experience and personal interviews enlightened the commissioners to the poor state of the educational system in the Philippines. In their observations of the natives, they concluded that “intelligent public opinion on which popular government rests does not exist in the Philippines, and it can not exist until education has elevated the masses, broadened their intellectual horizon, and disciplined their faculty of judgment.”¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹As quoted in Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 138.

¹⁶²U.S. Philippine Commission, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, 1900* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900), 1-2. At the time of his appointment, Schurman was serving as the President of Cornell University. The Philippine Commission also included Mr. Charles Denby and Mr. Dean C. Worcester, as well as Admiral Dewey and General Otis.

¹⁶³Ibid., 17.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., 182.

Acting on the recommendations of the First Philippine Commission, McKinley appointed a second commission to eventually assume government control from the military. In March 1900, he designated William H. Taft to replace Schurman and, as one of the Commission's many tasks, build upon the military's educational work. McKinley envisioned a primary school system in the Philippines that would "fit the people for the duties of citizenship and for the ordinary activities of a civilized community."¹⁶⁵ In doing so, the system would prepare the population for self-governance. Responsibility for school administration transferred from the Military Governor to the Commission on 1 September 1900 with a view of a comprehensive education system in the islands.¹⁶⁶

While the military's education efforts were geared toward reducing population support for the insurgency, Taft saw education as the way to build a Filipino political system. To him, pacification meant the Filipino realization that an American-led government was in their best interest. He described the difference between the military and civil government's purpose to U.S. legislators stating:

Now, the problem there was on the one hand to suppress the insurrection, and that had to be done with the Army. On the other hand, it was to teach the people that our purpose was not to continue a military government, but by object lessons to show them what civil government was by legislation and by putting it into force.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵U.S. Philippine Commission, *Reports of the Philippine Commission, the Civil Governor and the Heads of the Executive Departments of the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands, 1900-1903* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904), 10.

¹⁶⁶U.S. Bureau of Education, *Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1900-1901*, 1325.

¹⁶⁷Senate Committee on the Philippines, *Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate in Relation to Affairs in the Philippine Islands*, 57th Cong., 1st sess, 1902, 58.

Taft needed to drive a monumental change in Filipino mentality and viewed the primary school system as the best vehicle. Taft wrote in a Philippine journal that “The policy of the American Philippine Government is not to give in, or force upon, every worker in the rice fields a college education. In the nature of things, the great masses will only receive a primary education.”¹⁶⁸

For the most part, the General Superintendent of Schools within the Bureau of Public Instruction developed the educational policies in the islands. It was their job to come up with a policy that met the Commission’s strategic goals. The two major policy makers in the Philippines between 1900 and 1909 were Fred Atkinson and David Barrows. Under the Commission, the U.S. continued to use education as part of its counterinsurgency strategy in the Philippines. The Commission desired to convince Filipinos of American benevolence through the establishment of an educational system designed to prepare the native population for self-governance. The Commission members believed their educational efforts would pacify feelings of resistance towards U.S. presence in the archipelago and popular support would be a result of the U.S.’s constant involvement in the education system.

Problems Faced by the Commission

The Schurman Commission found Filipinos unprepared for the American style of government. During its investigations of the Philippine municipal governments established by the American military, members of the commission were concerned about what they saw. During the voting process, many of the Filipinos were confused and did

¹⁶⁸William H. Taft, “American Education in the Philippines: A Contrast to English and Dutch Colonial Policies,” *The Churchman*, October 1904, WHT, M R 563.

not understand what was expected of them. Some of the residents “went in succession to the commissioner present, the military representative, and the native priest, asking whom they were expected to vote for.”¹⁶⁹ This lack of understanding with regards to their civil duties caused concern among the Commission members over the future of the islands.

During the Spanish rule, education was reserved for the few children who belonged to the upper class. The average Filipino only had a few months of education and Spanish, the language of the ruling government, was reserved for the elites. The rest of society was only taught “the syllabary [sic] of their [native] language--the alphabet and the syllables and the church catechism.”¹⁷⁰ In Taft’s view, these substandard education practices grew a population of ignorant people who were “less likely to become discontented with the restrictions of government,” desiring only to become “hewers of wood and haulers of water.”¹⁷¹

In addition to the perceived ignorance of the Filipino, their culture was unacceptable by American standards. When the U.S. arrived in the Philippines, approximately ninety-two percent of the Filipino population was Christian, and as such, the U.S. categorized them as “civilized.” The vast majority, however, were extremely poor and uncultured.¹⁷² Taft felt the Filipinos were, in general, “lacking in moral character,” prone to corruption, and thus, “difficult persons out of whom to make an

¹⁶⁹U.S. Philippine Commission, *Report of the Philippine Commission 1900*, 178.

¹⁷⁰Senate Committee, *Affairs in the Philippine Islands*, 693.

¹⁷¹Taft, “American Education in the Philippines,” WHT, M R 563.

¹⁷²United States. Bureau of the Census, *Census of the Philippine Islands: Taken Under the Direction of the Philippine Commission in the Year 1903* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1905), 3:695.

honest government.”¹⁷³ He cited poor cleanliness, perceived laziness, and their fondness of cockfighting as examples of a society in need of advancement and reform.

Taft believed the answer to many of the Filipinos’ cultural issues were found in education. He blamed much of their failings on the poor educational policies of the friars and the Spanish government.¹⁷⁴ In calling for “the establishment of an adequate system of secularized and free public schools,” American policy makers signaled their desire for an American style of government in the Philippines.¹⁷⁵ Taft developed his policy in the Philippines around the goal of Filipino self-governance. In doing so, he did not think it was in America’s best interest to “secure a permanent government of ignorant people,” and surmised that in order to “develop the people into a self-governing people . . . popular education is, in our judgment, the first and most important means.”¹⁷⁶

The Commission’s desire to rebuild the Philippine education system could not wait and on 21 April 1900, while still sailing to Manila from the United States, Taft appointed Fred W. Atkinson as General Superintendent of Public Instruction.¹⁷⁷ Since the Commission did not yet have any executive or administrative power, Taft did not yet have the authority to make staff appointments, so he justified the early appointment to Secretary of War Elihu Root saying the Commission “deemed it of so much importance

¹⁷³Taft to Root, 14 July 1900, WHT, M R 640.

¹⁷⁴May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, 15.

¹⁷⁵U.S. Philippine Commission, *Report of the Philippine Commission, 1900*, 41.

¹⁷⁶Taft, “American Education in the Philippines,” WHT, M R 563.

¹⁷⁷Taft to Atkinson, 24 April 1900, WHT, M R 31.

to have our superintendent of instruction on the ground as early as possible, so as to get the benefit of the same observations that we shall have.”¹⁷⁸

The Education System under Atkinson

Atkinson came to the Commission highly recommended. In March 1900, Taft met Mr. Charles W. Eliot, the President of Harvard, and during their discussion asked if he knew of a suitable candidate to administer the educational system in the Philippines. Eliot suggested Atkinson. Atkinson was a Harvard graduate and held a Ph.D. from Leipzig in Germany. At the time, he was serving as a high school principle in Springfield, Massachusetts. The majority of Atkinson’s experience was in secondary education and he held no experience in school administration. Bernard Moses, the Commission’s Secretary of Public Instruction, disagreed with the appointment on the basis of Atkinson’s lack of experience. Taft, however, believed the American task in the Philippines was such a new venture that Atkinson’s lack of experience was not a factor.¹⁷⁹

After his arrival in Manila, Atkinson began to further the educational efforts started by the Army. He submitted draft legislation to the Commission which detailed his plan for the educational system as well as the responsibilities of the Department of Public Instruction.¹⁸⁰ The Commission passed Act 74, The Education Act, on 21 January 1901

¹⁷⁸Taft to Root, 21 April 1900, WHT M R 640.

¹⁷⁹May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, 79-81.

¹⁸⁰The Department of Public Instruction was later reorganized and renamed as the Bureau of Public Instruction n 8 October 1902, by Act 477 of the Philippine Commission. Terms of the Act are found in U.S. War Department. Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Acts of the Philippine Commission: Acts Nos. 425-949, Inclusive* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904), 8:84-88.

and centralized all public schools in the archipelago under the Bureau. The Act also directed the establishment of primary schools “in every pueblo in the archipelago where practicable, and shall reorganize those already established where such reorganization is necessary.”¹⁸¹ The Act spawned the growth of schools and became the catalyst for educational reform throughout the islands.

One of the reforms called out in the Act was for the establishment of English as the primary language. Section 14 of the Act stated “The English language shall, as soon as practicable, be made the basis of all public school instruction.”¹⁸² In doing so, the Commission took the military’s efforts one step further. According to their reports, many of the American officers in the islands thought language instruction within the schools should be restricted to English, however, the military did not have the resources necessary to put the policy in place. Since the Act called for the introduction of English “as soon as practicable,” it allowed for a period of transition until enough teachers arrived in the country to instruct both students and the native teachers. In the meantime, the Act allowed schools to continue the practice of using soldiers as teachers.

Taft made it clear to Atkinson that he thought the Filipinos should learn English in the schools. During Atkinson’s interview with the Commission prior to his appointment, Atkinson had abstained from expressing any opinion on the language of instruction in the Islands, despite the strong feelings from the other committee members

¹⁸¹U.S. Bureau of Education, *Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1900-1901*, 1330.

¹⁸²Ibid., 1332.

in favor of it.¹⁸³ In the same letter which Taft notified Atkinson of his appointment, as well as in subsequent letters, Taft suggested English should replace the use of native languages in the classroom. He informed Atkinson of the Commission's desire to "teach English in all the schools; and begin to do so at once," and suggested to him "that you prepare yourself and bring with you Trevellan's [sic] Education in India; it touches upon . . . teaching English instead of Sanscrit [sic] to the peoples in the schools in India."¹⁸⁴

There were several reasons behind the Commission's decision to base the country's educational system on English. One reason was the high cost of translating the different schoolbooks and primers into the multiple principle dialects.¹⁸⁵ Spanish was an option, but quickly dismissed since most natives outside Manila were unfamiliar with the language. Another reason for the introduction of English alluded to the U.S.'s economic vision for the Philippines. Neighboring countries such as China and Japan predominately used English in their ports and an understanding of the language would better equip Filipinos for international transactions.¹⁸⁶ There was also a popular desire among the population to learn English. In their final report to McKinley, The Schurman Commission

¹⁸³ May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, 81.

¹⁸⁴ Taft to Atkinson 8 May 1900 and 24 April 1900, WHT, MDLC, M, R31.

¹⁸⁵ Mr. Barrows later described there were eight different dialects widely spoken through the islands. For more information, see David P. Barrows, "Education and Social Progress in the Philippines," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 30 (July 1907): 73-74.

¹⁸⁶ Carl Crow, *America and the Philippines* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1914), 69-71. See also U.S. Philippine Commission, *Reports of the Philippine Commission, 1900-1903*, 123-24.

described how Filipinos “hailed with delight” at the opportunity to “learn the language of those in authority over them.”¹⁸⁷

Along with the economic, practical, and popular reasons for instituting English as the primary language of instruction, government officials emphasized the important role the language played in the establishment of a democratic government. They viewed English as “the language of free government;” one with which an understanding of it would allow Filipinos to “read the history of the hammering out by our ancestors of the heritage of liberty which we have had conferred on us.”¹⁸⁸ It is reasonable to assume that a democratic government is more effective in representing the majority of the population if there exists a common language to allow for the free flow of ideas among the population. However, no common language currently existed in the islands. The vast number of different languages and dialects within the islands made it possible for a resident to end up, in a single day’s travel, in a town where he could not communicate with anyone.¹⁸⁹ Dr. David P. Barrows, who began his tenure in the Philippines as Superintendent of Schools in Manila under Atkinson, and was currently the head of the Bureau for Non-Christian Tribes, expressed to Congress during a hearing in 1902 that “if the Filipino is to be enlightened at all, he has to have some medium of exchange from

¹⁸⁷U.S. Philippine Commission, *Report of the Philippine Commission, 1900*, 34.

¹⁸⁸As quoted in Crow, *America and the Philippines*, 70.

¹⁸⁹Ibid., 69.

tribe to tribe and from himself with the white race, and it is an exceedingly fortunate thing that his ambition at the present time is to acquire English.”¹⁹⁰

Members of the Philippine Commission as well as some Filipinos also believed English instruction would help in the pacification efforts and enlighten the natives to accept American governance. Barrows, during the same congressional hearing, testified to English instruction’s far reaching effects by saying “We hope that it will have a beneficial political effect; that is, the more they know of America and Americans and American Institutions, the more satisfied they will be under American rule.”¹⁹¹ Americans were not alone in realizing education’s positive effect on the population and the resulting views of American goodwill. Pardo de Tavera, a member of the Philippine Federalist Party, hoped English would enable Filipinos to assimilate into American culture:

After peace is established all of our efforts will be directed to Americanizing ourselves; to cause a knowledge of the English language to be extended and generalized in the Philippines, in order that through its agency the American spirit may take possession of us and that we may adopt its principles, its political customs, and its peculiar civilization that our redemption may be complete and radical.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ Senate Committee, *Affairs in the Philippine Islands*, 695. There has been much debate whether it was necessary to teach English to the Filipinos. There were as many as 60 different dialects in the Philippines, but only two, Tagalog and Visayan, are spoken by the majority and are very similar in nature. The examination of whether it was necessary to teach English is outside the scope of this study, and is mentioned simply for the interesting fact that both the military and civil governments in the Philippines saw it as part of their strategy to pacify and instill American values to the Filipino peoples.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 702.

¹⁹² As quoted in May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, 84.

Not all Filipinos viewed English as beneficial for the country. There were accounts of Filipino writings which denounced America's use of English in the islands. However there is no evidence to suggest that opposition to the instruction of English was widespread. In fact, in counter to the opposition, one Manila newspaper stated, "Against all the arguments that can be opposed to the teaching that is given in the public schools, there exists one that is irrefutable—the school attendance."¹⁹³

If the Philippine policymakers were going to mandate the use of English in the classrooms, they needed a battalion of American teachers. Section 15 of the Education Act allowed Atkinson to "obtain from the United States one thousand trained teachers."¹⁹⁴ The lack of teachers severely impeded the military's earlier attempts to teach English in all the schools. While one thousand teachers was not enough for every school, policymakers hoped that the American teachers could teach English to the native teachers, who in turn would instruct the students.

The influx of teachers to the islands was yet another idea Taft impressed upon Atkinson early on. The soldier-teacher had played an important role in the military's pacification effort and Taft thought civilian teachers would have the same positive effect. Before Atkinson left the U.S. for the Philippines, Taft asked him to correspond with the different American colleges and universities to find "teachers who would be willing to go

¹⁹³U.S. Philippine Commission. Bureau of Education, *Sixth Annual Report of the Director of Education, Fiscal Year 1906, To the Secretary of Public Instruction of the Government of the Philippine Islands*, by David P. Barrows (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1906), 17.

¹⁹⁴U.S. Bureau of Education, *Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1900-1901*, 1332.

to the islands to take charge of the primary and secondary schools . . . until . . . competent teachers may be developed from among the natives who can teach English.”¹⁹⁵

A portion of the teachers Atkinson hired came from inside the Philippines.

Atkinson offered soldiers assigned in the Philippines a chance to stay and teach after their volunteer regiments were discharged. Five hundred soldiers took the Department of Public Instruction’s exam to stay and teach. Of the applicants, the Department hired eighty soldiers who successfully met the qualifications. Some had no teaching experience, but were hired due to their “exceptional energy and education.”¹⁹⁶ In describing the performance of the soldiers turned teachers, Atkinson wrote, “Some of the very best teachers in the department came here originally as soldiers.”¹⁹⁷

The majority of American teachers in the Philippines, however, were civilians imported from the States. Most were college or normal school graduates and came from various places within the U.S. The most famous contingent arrived in Manila on 21 August 1901 aboard the Army transport ship *Thomas*. Of the 523 “Thomasites,” only thirty-one lacked post-secondary education. They arrived in the Philippines for various reasons: some as missionaries, some for adventure, and others simply wanted the higher pay afforded by the Commission.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵Taft to Atkinson, 8 May 1900, WHT, MDLC, M, R 31.

¹⁹⁶U.S. Bureau of Education, *Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1900-1901*, 1370.

¹⁹⁷Ibid.

¹⁹⁸May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, 85.

American teachers became the backbone of the U.S. strategy to harmonize American goodwill with the native population. Teachers “afford[ed] the people an opportunity of learning . . . what good American citizens are and what may be expected from American control”¹⁹⁹ The relationship between teacher and Filipino also encouraged a level of influence the Americans could not achieve any other way. Early in the American occupation efforts, Captain Henry T. Allen reported that Filipinos were relying on teachers for “counsel and advice,” and teachers “would have a tremendous influence in maintaining order and peace in the archipelago.”²⁰⁰ Americans were not the only ones to praise the teachers’ work. Mr. Mena Crisólogo, provincial governor of Ilocos Sur described the teachers’ treatment of pupils as having occurred “with the greatest care . . . and even with true affection,” and how they were “generally much loved in the towns.”²⁰¹

Filipino leaders also lauded the American teachers’ success in their ability to demonstrate the American government’s benevolent intentions in the islands. Mr. Bonafacio Serrano, a native Filipino and Governor of Masbate, wrote about the effect American teachers had with the population. According to Serrano, the teachers’ instruction and humanitarian work “have been such as to win the confidence and respect of the people, and no doubt done much to satisfy [the population] as to the real object of

¹⁹⁹U.S. Bureau of Education, *Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1900-1901*, 1389.

²⁰⁰Ibid.

²⁰¹Ibid., 1392.

American occupation.”²⁰² Teachers were also able to influence former insurgents and their leaders. One American official reported that the satisfaction their teachers gave to the “families of Macabulos, De Leon, Lopez, Rigor, Ramos, and others . . . have nothing but words of praise for Deputy Superintendent White and his assistants.”²⁰³

While the American teachers brought a sense of hope to the educational system, Atkinson found there were many problems he had to overcome. Schools were insufficient in number to meet the population’s need, school materials were in short supply, and the curriculum left over from the Spanish was of substandard quality. In Taft’s inaugural address, after assuming executive control from the military on 4 July 1901, he commented on the state of the school system:

The school system is hardly begun as an organized machine. . . . School houses are yet to be built; school rooms are yet to be equipped. Our most satisfactory ground for hope of success in the whole work is in the eagerness with which the Philippine people, even the humblest, seek for education.²⁰⁴

The poor state of school infrastructure hurt the American efforts to bring education to the Philippine masses. Both the American military and civilian governments in the Philippines desired a compulsory education system in the islands, but the infrastructure could not accommodate it. Primary school construction relied on tax revenues within the municipalities. Many of the areas could not raise the necessary revenues to build or sustain schools. As an example, Manila tax revenues in support of the schools equaled 221,025 pesos between 1902 and 1903; the municipalities of Ambos

²⁰²Ibid., 1393.

²⁰³Ibid., 1390.

²⁰⁴William H. Taft, “Inaugural Address,” 4 July 1901, WHT, MDLC, M, R 563.

Camarines, however, had a similar population to that of Manila, but could only raise 12,552 pesos for educational support.²⁰⁵

Atkinson's focus on primary education caused the education system to lose credibility amongst the population. Because of the Philippine government's focus on primary education, there were very few public secondary schools. Since most of the private and religious secondary schools still conducted their classes in Spanish, primary school students began "to entertain serious doubts . . . of continuing their studies in English in schools of a higher grade, and some of them thought it advisable to resume their studies of Spanish in order that they might be prepared to enter the Spanish schools of secondary instruction."²⁰⁶ The Commission finally passed a law authorizing public secondary schools on 7 March 1902.²⁰⁷ The country's census reflected the expansion of private primary schools in the country. In spring 1903 there were 1,593 public primary schools in the islands compared to the 1,265 private and religious primary schools. The government's lack of attention to the secondary schools is easily apparent with the forty public secondary schools in the archipelago compared to the sixty-two private and religious secondary schools.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁵ May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, 96.

²⁰⁶ U.S. Philippine Commission, Department of Public Instruction, *The First Annual Report of the Secretary of Public Instruction to the Philippine Commission for the Year Ending October 15, 1902*, by Bernard Moses (Manila: Bureau of Public Printing, 1902), 16-17.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 16.

²⁰⁸ U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of the Philippine Islands*, 671.

In addition to the problems Atkinson faced in terms of building up the schools, he was not as successful in preparing Filipinos for citizenship as Taft had desired. Atkinson used the black education system in the U.S. as a foundation for the Philippine system. As such, he focused his efforts in industrial education, which included manual and vocational training. Atkinson did not think Filipinos were capable of much more than manual work, and their capacity was limited to “industrial and mechanical pursuits.”²⁰⁹ He saw the value of industrial education “in teaching economy, thrift, and the dignity of labor and giving moral backbone to the students.”²¹⁰

Atkinson’s beliefs in the Filipinos’ racial inferiority did not coincide with Taft’s desire to prepare the population for self-government. Taft relieved Atkinson in the fall of 1902, and appointed Mr. Elmer Bryan to succeed him. Bryan, however, filled the post for only a few months and was forced to resign due to serious illness. Taft then picked Dr. David P. Barrows as the next General Superintendent of Public Instruction.²¹¹

The Barrows Reforms

Barrows received his Ph.D. in Indian studies from the University of Chicago. After receiving his degree, he taught for a few years at California’s normal school in San Diego. He arrived in the Philippines in 1900 as the Superintendent of Schools in Manila

²⁰⁹As quoted in May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, 92.

²¹⁰As quoted in Ibid.

²¹¹Ibid., 96.

and a year later, became the Commission's head for the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes.

In August 1903, he succeeded Bryan as the general superintendent.²¹²

Barrows built his educational strategy around changing the social structure of the natives. He wanted to make sure the lower-class received the same educational opportunities of those children who came from families of wealth. He felt the public schools should be "open to all upon a purely democratic basis."²¹³ Concerned the government administration was judging the success of the education system based on the "capacity and cleverness of the youth of the cultivated class," he stressed "the primary and essential importance of educating the child of the peasant."²¹⁴ Barrows thought if schools could reach the peasantry within the country, the government could raise the standards of the *gente baja*, or lower-class.

The wide gap which existed between the two classes of Filipinos in 1903 was damaging to the American goal of self-governance in the islands. The gap between the two societal classes, the *gente baja* or illustrious-class, and the *gente ilustrada*, the lower-class, resulted in the Spanish system of *caciquisimo*, where the *gente baja* economically dominated the lower-class. The *gente ilustrada* were the fortunate, possessing education and wealth while the rest of the population, who were generally poor and uneducated, belonged to the *gente baja*. Barrows estimated that for every ten to twelve thousand

²¹²Ibid., 97.

²¹³U.S. Philippine Commission, *Reports of the Philippine Commission, 1900-1903*, 714.

²¹⁴Ibid.

people, there were less than a dozen families in the *gente ilustrada*.²¹⁵ He wanted to ensure that the societal gap did not result in an aristocratic type of government.

Barrows believed Atkinson's industrial education focus failed to address the social gap between the two classes and rid the country of *caciquisimo*, and as such, Barrows approached Filipino education differently. He viewed education as a literary endeavor, and saw value in the traditional academic subjects rather than manual labor.²¹⁶ He did not agree with Atkinson's feelings that Filipinos did not like to work. He felt the program Atkinson put in place made Filipinos more like laborers who worked for "day wages under conditions of hours and methods of labor set by their foreign employers."²¹⁷ Instead, Barrows saw Filipinos as having the same capabilities as the white man and wanted to create a "peasant-proprietor" who owned and worked his own land, was literate in English, and could transact in any necessary type of business.²¹⁸ He set out to design an education system to change the *gente baja*'s societal position:

Our aim is to destroy *caciquisimo* and to replace the dependent class with a body of independent peasantry, owning their own homes, able to read and write, and thereby gain access to independent sources of information, able to perform simple calculations, keep their own accounts and consequently to rise out of their condition of indebtedness, and inspire if possible with a new spirit of self-respect, a new consciousness of personal dignity and civil rights.²¹⁹

²¹⁵Senate Committee, *Affairs in the Philippine Islands*, 680-81. See also Barrows, "Education and Social Progress in the Philippines," 72-73.

²¹⁶May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, 99.

²¹⁷U.S. Philippine Commission, *Reports of the Philippine Commission, 1900-1903*, 718.

²¹⁸Ibid.

²¹⁹Barrows, "Education and Social Progress in the Philippines," 73.

One key was to build the students' mathematical skills. To do so, he introduced a curriculum to familiarize students with basic numbers in their first year of instruction. By the second year, students received forty minutes of mathematics instruction each day.²²⁰

The introduction of civics lessons became another of Barrows' curriculum reforms. Many of the American leaders in the Philippines thought Filipinos were ignorant towards the role of government and their duties as a citizen. Taft described the Filipino's knowledge of civics and government in a journal article:

We find then, among the Filipinos, first, a lack of knowledge as to whether their civil rights are; and second, a lack of knowledge--even if they knew what their rights were, as to how they would assert them; and third, an entire absence of any responsibility for the actions of the government in preserving order or enforcing laws. It therefore becomes the duty of the government like that we are establishing among them, to see to it that people are educated sufficiently to know what their rights are, and are advised as to how such rights can be asserted.²²¹

Teachers organized students into civics "clubs" and held discussions regarding the roles of elected officials, the aspects of the local government, and the expectations of citizenship. They impressed upon the students "the development of civic patriotism and a true respect for the law and the rights of the people."²²² In 1907, the primary education system expanded from three years to four, and students received additional civics instruction twice a week in their last year of primary education.²²³

²²⁰U.S. Philippine Commission, Bureau of Education, "Circular No. 51," 10 June 1907, NACP RG 350 E 95 B 21.

²²¹Taft, "American education in the Philippines," WHT, MDLC, M R 563.

²²²As quoted in May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, 102.

²²³Bureau of Education, "Circular number 51," NACP RG 350 E 95 B 21.

In addition to the curriculum reforms, Barrows needed to increase the capacity of the system to educate a larger portion of the population. Since education was seen as a way to pacify the population to accept American rule, American policy makers in the Philippines always maintained the desire to provide every Filipino student a primary school education. Barrows wanted to find a way to educate the estimated 1,200,000 children in the Philippines. In 1903, he tailored the primary education curriculum from four years to three based on his belief that “three years was the minimum amount of instruction which a child should receive, and it was felt also that if he got this much and got it during the most receptive years of childhood, his illiteracy would be broken.”²²⁴ He also defined the primary school age to be between six and fifteen years old, which created a nine year span to offer a child a three year primary education. In doing so, Barrows calculated that if the school system could maintain four-hundred thousand school children annually, he could offer every child in the archipelago a primary school education during their most formative years.²²⁵

Barrows also needed to increase the number of teachers if he wanted to accommodate four hundred thousand students every year. He calculated it would require a teaching force of six thousand to educate the desired number of students annually. The number of teachers necessitated a reliance on native instruction. He chose four hundred American teachers and sent them on a “campaign of education.”²²⁶ They were made district supervising teachers, and as such, were responsible for securing buildings for

²²⁴Barrows, “Education and Social Progress in the Philippines,” 74.

²²⁵Ibid., 75-77.

²²⁶Ibid., 76.

schools, funds, and finding and recruiting suitable teachers. One Filipino governor stated that within his province, “There are no stronger *Americanistas* . . . than those school children who in the past two to three years have come within the sphere of personal influence of the American teachers, and such converts to the American ways and ideas are seldom lost.”²²⁷ The actions of many teachers were having an assimilating effect on the population.

Barrows’ campaign had a multiplying effect on the student population and the increase helped bring America’s pacification efforts to more remote areas of the country. More parents began enrolling their children in schools. In 1903, there were approximately 150,000 children in regular attendance in the schools along with a native teaching force of three thousand. In 1906, the average student attendance increased to 375,534 with 4,719 teachers.²²⁸ Mr. Juan Pimental, the provincial governor of Camarines, reasoned in 1905 that the increase in the student population was due to the students’ convictions that “their regeneration depends upon education,” and as such, they “attend school, hungering for culture.”²²⁹ The efforts to increase the student population was clearly visible within the Province of Capiz. Primary school attendance increased from 722 students to 15,973

²²⁷U.S. Philippine Commission, *Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1903* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904), 3:707.

²²⁸U.S. Philippine Commission, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War, 1909* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1910), 187. The numbers reflect average student attendance. The actual enrollment figures are higher, but students did not always attend school regularly. Reasons for irregular attendance ranged from difficulties in getting the child to school as well as some parents needed their child to stay home and work.

²²⁹U.S. Philippine Commission, *Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1905* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1906), 155.

between 1904 and 1905. The number of total schools, including primary, intermediate, and night, rose from thirteen to 137 during the same time period. One suggested reason for the drastic increase could be due to the teachers. The number of American teachers in the province more than doubled from ten to more than twenty-two. Provincial governors credited the increase to “the condition of tranquility prevailing therein as well as the great interest had by all of its inhabitants in the education of their children.”²³⁰ When Barrows would leave his post in 1909, the average monthly attendance reached 437,735 students with 7,949 native teachers.²³¹ The population widely accepted the expansion of schools and teachers throughout the islands.

The increase in students also meant the need for additional infrastructure. To fix the already overpopulation of many of the schoolhouses, Barrows needed to increase the number of schools. He expanded the reach of the schoolhouses away from the cities and towns and into the barrios and pueblos. Public primary school numbers increased every year. In 1903, there were 1,593 public primary schools in the Philippines. In 1906, the number had grown to 3,166 and by 1909 there were a total of 4,194 primary schools.²³²

The continual pacification of the natives showed in the towns’ involvement in the build-up of schools. Often, towns received multiple donations to help fund school construction and purchase supplies. In the province of Bohol, for example, the natives contributed a total of 14,315 pesos worth of labor and materials to construct schoolhouses within the barrios. In the municipality, another 4,139 pesos of labor, contributions, and

²³⁰Ibid., 205.

²³¹U.S. Philippine Commission, *Report of the Philippine Commission 1909*, 187.

²³²Ibid.

cash went towards the construction of schools. In total, out of the 18,454 pesos expended towards school construction, natives contributed all but 3,435 pesos.²³³ In the words of the provincial governor, “Public education . . . received a new impulse, not only because of the eagerness felt by the youth of the island for education, but also . . . by the people who have contributed to the construction of schoolhouses in the centers of the towns as well as in the barrios.”²³⁴

Barrows’ reform efforts went beyond increasing student attendance and schoolhouses; he worked to standardize and improve the quality of education by fitting the instruction to the cultural understandings of the people. The cultural differences between provinces lowered the quality of the overall school system. Division superintendents arranged coursework on how they thought best fit the abilities of the teachers and students. Rural areas were especially affected since many of the students and teachers were less educated. Graduates from one municipality did not necessarily meet the same standards from another. In 1903, Barrows distributed a standardized course of study for all primary schools to follow.²³⁵ Additionally, some of the books previously distributed by the military and Atkinson were racially biased, depicting items Filipino children could not connect with. As an example, some of the English readers depicted fruits which the natives could not relate to. Barrows purchased and distributed new textbooks that students throughout the islands could contextually understand. As the

²³³U.S. Philippine Commission, *Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1905*, 180.

²³⁴Ibid.

²³⁵Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Philippines: Reports, Director of Education: 1899-1907*, 78, NACB E 95 RG 350.

historian Stanley Karnow wrote, “Primers now showed Juan and Maria walking through rice fields instead of John and Mary in the snow, and avocados and coconuts replaced apples and pears.”²³⁶

In addition to Barrows’ efforts to increase Filipino educational opportunities within the archipelago, the Commission desired to send Filipino students to the U.S. for an education. The chance to remove natives from their environment and send them off for an education where they would be surrounded by American culture was another attempt of American policymakers to pacify Filipinos to accept American rule. It was a strategy reminiscent of the Army’s Indian boarding schools; officials hoped the Filipinos would immerse themselves in Anglo-Saxon values and witness the benefits of the American lifestyle for themselves so they could return to the Philippines as agents for cultural change. One reporter best summed up the expected outcome from sending Filipinos to the States:

It is thought the return to the islands of a number of bright young natives who became thoroughly familiar with American institutions would furnish just the leaven that would do more good than anything else to thoroughly civilize and partly Americanize the inhabitants of the Philippines.²³⁷

In 1903, The Philippine Commission passed Act 854 which authorized the Civil Governor to “select and appoint . . . one hundred students to be educated in the United States at the expense of the Government of the Philippine Islands.”²³⁸ There were 179

²³⁶ Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1990), 206.

²³⁷ Anon, “Business Men's Club May Bring One or More Natives to this City,” *Commercial Tribune*, 13 December 1900, WHT, MDLC M R32.

²³⁸ U.S. War Department, *Acts of the Philippine Commission*, 669.

Filipinos enrolled in U.S. schools and universities by 1905. Students enrolled in various courses of study to include Engineering, Business, Domestic Sciences and Painting. Some attended universities such as Notre Dame, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Georgetown University.²³⁹ Taft lauded the ability to send Filipinos to the U.S. and saw it as an opportunity for Filipinos to “breathe in the atmosphere of our free institutions, and carry home the ideals which they shall form here in the most formative period of their lives.”²⁴⁰ If one were classify the “Thomasites” as a battalion of teachers, charged with bringing American values and culture to the islands in an attempt to civilize and pacify the natives, the Filipinos who returned to the islands after receiving an American education would have to be classified as a Company of agents trying to do the same.

Barrows was successful in implementing many reforms and increasing the literacy of the Philippine population. He focused education efforts on literacy, which he believed provided children an educational background which could raise the lower-class’ standard of living. By 1907, new leadership within the Philippine Commission dictated a different educational path than Barrows had prescribed. Commissioners such as W. Cameron Forbes preferred an industrial education much like the type Atkinson pursued. Frustrated at the new direction and lack of priority given, Barrows resigned his post in 1909.

²³⁹U.S. Philippine Commission, *Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission 1905* (1906), 31.

²⁴⁰William. H. Taft, “Address before the Army and Navy Banquet of the Ohio Society of New York,” 5 March 1904, WHT, MDLC, M, R 563.

Political Education

As early as 1900, there was also a system of education present outside of the schoolhouses and fell outside the jurisdiction of the education department. The Commission thought Filipinos could learn from the actions of the government. Historian Glenn May dubbed this form of instruction as “political education.”²⁴¹ Taft was concerned that if the U.S. left the Philippines, the country’s government would revert back to the dictatorial policies of the Spaniards, because was the only form of government the Filipinos knew. He described his concerns in 1902 stating, “But were these islands to be abandoned the men who would control would be ambitious demagoggs, the men who would be willing to resort to violent measures to establish their power and who would ultimately bring about a chaos and internecine strife to the Islands.”²⁴² Filipino interactions in municipal and provincial governments provided the average Filipino the opportunity for “wider and wider practice in self-government so that by actual experience they may learn the duties of the citizen.”²⁴³

Philippine policy makers viewed municipal governments as a chance for daily instruction on the execution of proper government. Commissioner Dean Worcester, a long-standing member of the Philippine Commission, argued that municipalities would “afford a school of politics for the education of the people of the duties of good

²⁴¹May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, 41-53.

²⁴²William H. Taft, “The People of the Philippine Islands,” *The Independent* (1902), WHT, MDLC, M, R 563.

²⁴³Taft, “American Education in the Philippines,” WHT, MDLC, M, R 563.

citizenship.²⁴⁴ Filipinos learned the workings of government through administrative jobs such as tax collection, property management, construction, and school administration. Daily interaction allowed the population to see how government worked and allowed them to formulate expectations of their elected officials. Provincial government jobs offered Filipinos similar opportunities.²⁴⁵ Taft hoped that through Filipino interactions, the population would realize the benefits American rule and an American style of government.

Filipinos also had opportunities to serve in national levels of government. The Philippine Commission dedicated three spots to native Filipinos with the same powers as Americans in the Commission, although Americans maintained a majority. There also existed the Philippine Assembly, which started in 1907, and acted as the lower house in a two-house legislature, much like House of Representatives in the U.S. system.²⁴⁶ The Assembly encompassed 80 elected officials from the Christian provinces in islands.²⁴⁷ The Assembly provided Filipinos a platform to express their opinions with regards to the strategic direction of the Philippines and chance to affect national policies. The system was not perfect and, in the beginning, voting laws skewed government activities towards the upper class. Its big accomplishment, however, was to show Filipinos they had a voice in government, unlike their experience with the Spanish government.

²⁴⁴May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, 41.

²⁴⁵Ibid., 41-53.

²⁴⁶Manuel L. Quezon, “Recent Progress in the Philippines,” *The Journal of Race Development* 5, no. 3 (January 1915): 234.

²⁴⁷May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, 58-59.

Conclusion

The American government in the Philippines realized it needed to win the support of the population so it could effectively run the government without worries of popular resistance. The military could not operate in the Philippines indefinitely, and the U.S. established a civil form of government within the archipelago. Initially, the U.S. did not think Filipinos were ready for the task of self-governance, they had neither the education nor the experience. The Commission relied on educational reforms to prepare the population for self-government.

The educational goals of the country reflected the desires of the educational and political leaders. The Commission had always maintained its desire to prepare the population for self-government. As the first general superintendent, Atkinson built upon the suggestions and workings of the military. He successfully instituted a curriculum which made English the primary language in the country. As well, he oversaw the invasion of an army of teachers into the Philippines who brought with hem education and American values. The teachers were instrumental in demonstrating American goodwill and won the support of many families and former insurgents. Barrows desired to close the societal gap and rid the country of *caciquisimo*, which he viewed as an impediment to progress towards Filipino self-government. He instituted curriculum reforms which stresses literacy and civics and provided Filipinos with the tools to interact on a commercial level. Together, Atkinson and Barrows demonstrated American interest in the Filipino's well being and, in turn, Filipinos generally responded with acceptance.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The U.S Army entered unchartered territory when it arrived at Manila in the summer of 1898. The Philippine-American War was an outcome from America's first attempt at colonization. After the fall of Manila, the U.S. Army became an occupation force and established a government in the archipelago. In December of 1898, under the provisions of the Treaty of Paris, the U.S. purchased the Philippines from Spain for twenty million dollars. In the Philippines, the U.S. would stress the importance of education in its efforts to pacify anti-U.S. sentiment and win the support of the population. It relied on its experiences in the post-Civil War Reconstruction period and its efforts to civilize the American Indians as a foundation for its efforts to educate and assimilate the Filipinos to accept American sovereignty in the islands.

The U.S. relied on a mixture of force and education to achieve social stability within its borders during Reconstruction and the American-Indian Wars, and used similar tactics in the Philippines.²⁴⁸ Based on its experiences during Reconstruction and its Westward expansion, education became a deliberate part of the country's counterinsurgency strategy to pacify anti-occupation violence and assimilate the people of the Philippines. Military and civilian leaders alike shared the same beliefs in education's effectiveness to bring the American way of life to foreign lands.

The U.S. first tested education's effectiveness in its attempts to assimilate the freedmen in the South. While most held fast to the existing racial view that the black race

²⁴⁸Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, 39-43.

was inferior, they also believed blacks could become productive, even as second-class members within a white society. Legislators, military officials and philanthropists established means for encouraging black education. Largely due to their efforts, black literacy raised from 20.1 percent in 1870 to 55.5 percent in 1900.²⁴⁹ On the subject, W.E.B Du Bois, a prominent black civil rights activist, wrote, “Had it not been for the Negro school and college, the Negro would, to all intents and purposes, have been driven back into slavery.” He continued to state that, through schooling, freedmen “had acquired enough leadership and knowledge to thwart the worst designs of the new slave drivers.”²⁵⁰ African American men and women became educated as laborers and, despite limitations faced from racism, secured a role in American society. Similar questions existed regarding the Native American Indians.

As the country expanded west, the U.S. needed a solution for the displaced native Indians who occupied the land that the country acquired for white settlements. In general, Americans viewed Indians as savages during the American-Indian Wars and backed the popular mantra that “A good Indian is a dead Indian.” Enlightened officers such as Captain Richard Pratt, however, believed their savagery was a result of their upbringing and environment and not of their race. He felt that Indians, immersed in a civilized environment and educated at the same level as their white counterparts, could positively contribute to American society.

The Army experimented with Pratt’s idea and established boarding schools as a short cut to Americanization and civility. Education allowed Indians the opportunity to

²⁴⁹Tyack and Lowe, “The Constitutional Moment,” 249.

²⁵⁰Ibid.

interact socially and professionally within American society while maintaining similar intellectual grounding. The U.S. placed a heavy emphasis on Indian schooling. As the U.S. focused its efforts towards the Philippines, leaders cited Native American educational successes as a blueprint. At the 19th Annual Meeting of the Mohonk Conference in 1899, Morgan stated that “We have learned that it is possible to accomplish very much for people as hopeless as some of the Indian tribes seemed to be twenty-five years ago; that a system of education will produce the same results among them under the same circumstances as it produces elsewhere.”²⁵¹

The Army viewed native Filipinos in much the same way they viewed African Americans and Native Americans. In all three efforts, education played a significant role. In Manila, soldiers began to repair and reopen schools immediately after they occupied the town; very similar to General Nathaniel Banks’ establishment of black schools in Louisiana during Union occupation in 1863. The Filipinos desire for education fit nicely into the American strategy.

As a means to demonstrate American benevolence, the military instituted educational reforms and built schools to increase educational opportunities for the Philippine population. Previously, the Spanish government in the archipelago reserved education for the wealthy. The children of poor families that did attend primary school measured their school experience in months rather than years and gained only enough education to speak the local dialect and participate in the church parish. However, as Superintendent of Schools, McKinnon secularized the public school system in 1899,

²⁵¹Morgan, “The Relation of the Government to Its Dependent Classes,” 24.

which allowed weakened the friar's control of the population. Under American occupation, schools were open to all and space became the only limiting factor.

Under Spanish rule, teachers taught the language of the local tribe, reserving Spanish instruction for the *gente ilustrada*. Immediately after opening schools, McKinnon introduced English instruction into the curriculum. The majority of the population, embraced the new language since instruction in English allowed Filipinos to speak the same language as those in power. As a result, classrooms sometimes were packed with onlookers as well as students and adults filled the night school classes for a chance to learn the language. Soldiers filled the role of English instructors which enforced interaction between soldiers and natives. Soldiers taught one class during the day and often offered English instruction to parents and native teachers in the evenings. The school environment offered natives the chance to view soldiers in surroundings different from those associated with the devastation war while providing a wanted service to the population.

The Army capitalized on the Filipinos' desire to learn English and used the schoolhouse to gain the support of the population. As John Gates stated in his study of the Army's efforts in the Philippines, "In many cases a school was the first thing established by the army in a town, even preceding the rudiments of municipal government."²⁵² The Army built approximately one thousand schools between 1898 and 1902 in an attempt to accommodate the high Filipino demand for instruction.²⁵³

²⁵²Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 87.

²⁵³Swendiman, "The Development of Education in the Philippine Islands Since 1898," 3.

Schoolhouses were in shambles, if they existed at all, and schools did not have enough books or supplies for their students. In addition to building schools, the Army purchased school materials to fill the shortage left by the Spanish government. Otis saw the importance of the Army's involvement in education and even personally selected many of the schoolbooks himself.²⁵⁴ The Army laid the foundation for the new civilian government in the Philippines to evolve the education system and prepare the Filipino for self-government, further pacifying the population to accept American occupation.

After the military transferred executive power to the Commission in September 1901, the civil government continued to use education to pacify the population. The Commission maintained a narrative which identified Filipino self-governance as the U.S.'s ultimate goal in the Philippines. Simultaneously, Government leaders also publicly expressed the idea that the viability of good government relied on an educated population. As such, the credibility of the American narrative rested largely on the Commission's educational reforms. The Philippine Commission expanded education's reach to the most remote parts of the islands and reformed the school system to civilize the population and raise the lower class' living standard in order to demonstrate American goodwill toward the ultimate goal of self-governance.

In addition to the Commission's desire for political and social advancement in the islands, they viewed education as a useful tool in demonstrating American goodwill. The Commission enacted a multitude of educational reforms that Filipinos widely embraced. Shortly after receiving executive powers, the Commission signed the Education Act which, among other things, mandated the use of English in schools. As justification, the

²⁵⁴Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 82, 86.

Commission cited the need for natives to maintain a common platform of communication among the numerous dialects. Regardless of the reason, the change proved very popular and built trust between native Filipinos and the American government based on a common interest. The Commission imported thousands of teachers from the states to teach English to students and native teachers. For the most part, Filipinos viewed the American educators as concrete examples of American benevolence. Military and civilian leaders continually cited teachers as one of the main reason for peace in the islands.

The Commission also reformed the primary school curriculum to reduce the gap between economic classes and instill the ideals of citizenship among the population. Barrows desired to create an independent lower class, which owned property and had the intelligence to participate in government. The new school curriculum emphasized classical subjects such as reading, writing, and arithmetic as well as geography, science, and music in order to raise the students' intellectual level and inspire them to become more than just laborers. Industrial skills such as farming and agriculture were also taught in the hope to incentivize Filipinos to own and cultivate their own lands, providing lower class Filipinos with a sense of wealth and ownership. In doing so, Taft and Barrows wanted to advance the Filipinos' standard of living, hoping to reduce the gap between the *gente ilustrada* and the *gente baja*, and destroy *caciquisimo*.

Taft also envisioned that Filipinos would receive a political education outside of the schools and in their daily interactions with members of the municipal governments. Filipinos, elected by the local population, staffed the positions within the municipalities

and many of the provinces.²⁵⁵ In Taft's mind, experience was the best teacher and there was no better way to learn about government than to participate in it. The insular government delegated local issues, such as school construction, to the municipal governments, and as a result, Filipinos had a voice in many aspects of their everyday livelihood.

The military and civil governments heavily relied on education to pacify anti-U.S. aggression and gain Filipino acceptance for long-term U.S. presence in the islands. During the Reconstruction period, the Army realized the efficacy of education as a tool for control. The U.S. again realized education's ability to control a population as well as change a culture during its educational experiments with the Indians. The civil government used tactics employed during both of those efforts as part of its effort in the Philippines. The Army and the U.S. government designed black education along racial barriers and societal hierarchy; Atkinson emphasized industrial education for Filipinos believing they were racially inferior to whites and incapable of anything more. Alternatively, Barrows followed the Indian model of education, and attempted to advance their culture and bring about societal change through a curriculum which stressed literacy. Historians such as Glenn May and Renato Constantino have argued whether the Americans succeeded in establishing a successful educational system. Whether or not American efforts were successful in advancing Filipino culture and cultivating a literate population capable of self-governance, the evidence presented in this study show that the American efforts to build an educational system was successful in winning the population's support for American sovereignty in the Philippines.

²⁵⁵Taft, "American Education in the Philippines," WHT, MDLC, M, R 563.

Areas for Additional Study

There are still only a relative few published academic works on the Philippine-American War. This research paper focused on the education of “civilized tribes” within the Philippines and did not address any of the non-Christian tribes such as the Moros. There seems to be little information on American interactions with the Moros other than direct military action, especially with respect to education. Some of the earlier primary source documents excluded numbers relating to the Moros. Research into Moro pacification with respect to education or any other civil affairs perspective could become useful to help shape future limited conflicts with respect to pacification of a non-Christian population, especially in looking at the educational methods, their desire for education, and how religious differences affect the relationship between teacher and student. As seen in this study, many of the comments regarding Filipino acceptance and success in winning the population’s support has come from American sources. While there are a few sources which detail the Filipino perspective, most come from the literate and wealthy *gente ilustrada* class. More research needs to occur to understand the lower-class Filipino perspective, both among the Moros as well as the Christian tribes.

Relevance to the Future

The role of education in counterinsurgency warrants investigation, but can not become the sole answer in a belligerent's efforts. The Philippine Insurrection is an interesting case study since American educational efforts and desires lined up with the needs and desires of the population. A force which finds itself engaged in a counterinsurgency must understand the people’s true desires and include the information as part of its counterinsurgency strategy.

Another lesson that armies should take from this war is the importance in winning the support of the population at home. Support for Philippine annexation was split in the U.S. and the country's commitment in the Philippines rested on the 1900 election. Based on the timing of the next election and the lack of overwhelming support for the war, McKinley's Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation may have been a policy founded on compromise in order to win votes for his upcoming election. Political restraints are issues that democratic governments, such as the U.S. will continually face. As such, the military must remain flexible in the way it prepares for and executes a conflict.

American actions during the Philippine-American War suggest that the country's values have an important affect on the military's strategy. American beliefs on the efficacy of education with respect towards pacification reflect the Progressive attitudes resident in American culture during the insurrection. Philippine policymakers as well as many within the military believed that education was the quickest way for foreigners to recognize the superiority of American culture. That belief is not as prevalent in American society today. Currently, Americans are generally more culturally sensitive and the imposition of a different value system onto other cultures is unacceptable. Recent Coalition efforts in the Middle East serve as proof of American desires to instill a form of government within the country that may not fit with the region's culture. Yet, there is a desire among many Westerners to protect the culture of others.

The Philippine-American War highlights the lessons of many problems an occupying force can expect after it enters a foreign country. It is highly likely that many of the aspects witnessed in the Philippines will be repeated: the clash of two distinct cultures, an armed insurgency, and the need for both sides to win the support of the

people. The U.S.'s experiences in the Philippine highlight the necessity to win the support of the population as an aid in its efforts to separate the insurgents from the population.

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